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	 	 AbstrACt
Living	ihe	Transition
A Bottom-up Perspective on Rwanda’s Political
Transition
Political transitions are dominantly analyzed top-down 
and focus on a narrow range of political processes and institutions. 
Critical rethinkings of the ‘transition paradigm’ entail that structural 
factors, such as historical legacies and ethnic make-up, determine the 
trajectory of political transitions. In this paper we intend to comple-
ment top-down approaches by offering a bottom-up perspective re-
vealing what it means to live through a transition in the ordinary per-
ception. We use the Rwandan transition as case-study. An analysis of 
over 400 life histories of ordinary Rwandan peasants and their subjec-
tive ranking exercises over time on a ‘ladder of life’ portrays the trajec-
tory of the Rwandan transition as perceived from below. The ethnicity 
of the respondents functions as pivot to shed light on the structural 
factor underlying the Rwandan transition: the Hutu-Tutsi bi-polarity. 
résumé
Vivre	la	Transition
Une Perspective du Bas vers le Haut sur la Transition  
      Politique Rwandaise
Les transitions politiques sont surtout analysées du haut 
vers le bas et se concentrent sur une liste restreinte de processus et 
d’institutions  politiques.  Repenser  avec  un  esprit  critique  “le  para-
digme de la transition” implique que les facteurs  structurels comme 
les héritages historiques  et les appartenances ethniques  déterminent 
la trajectoire des transitions politiques. Dans cet article, nous avons 
l’intention de compléter l’approche du haut vers le bas  en offrant une 
perspective du bas vers le haut  révélant ce que signifie vivre une tran-
sition dans la  perception et l’expérience ordinaire. Nous utilisons la  
transition rwandaise comme sujet d’étude. Une analyse de plus de 
400 histoires de vie de simples paysans rwandais et leurs essais sub-
jectifs de classification dans le temps sur une “échelle de vie’’  décri-
vent la trajectoire  de la transition rwandaise  comme perçue par le bas. 
L’ethnicité des personnes interrogées fonctionne comme pivot  pour 
éclairer le facteur structurel sous-jacent de la transition rwandaise: la 
bipolarité Hutu-TutsiIOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
	 1.	 IntroduCtIon
In 1990, a political transition was initiated in Rwanda. 
Several  factors  influenced  the  incumbent  regime  –  a  so-called  de-
velopment dictatorship - that came into place after the 1973 coup by 
Juvenal Habyarimana to open up and instigate liberal reforms that 
should eventually have led to a democracy. Domestic opposition forc-
es came into play, contesting and competing for power that was un-
til then mainly centred in the hands of a Hutu clique from the North 
of the country. At the same time, a Tutsi-dominated rebel force, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) started a civil war against the Habyar-
imana regime. During a social revolution in 1959, the Tutsi monarchy 
was abolished and thousands of Tutsi had sought refuge in neighbour-
ing coutries, fleeing the violence targeting their ethnic group. Their de-
scendants were, at the end of the 80s, demanding a return to Rwanda. 
The denial of this return by the Habyarimana regime made them resort 
to an armed means of access to the country and a share in power. In 
August 1993, the Arusha peace agreement established an official end 
to the war and sought a compromise between the different parties in-
volved: the elite on the side of the Habyarimana regime, the internal 
opposition forces and the armed rebel force (RPF). 
The agreement was never implemented since the crash 
of the plane carrying Habyarimana unleashed a genocidal campaign 
against Tutsi civilians and so-called “moderate Hutu” not in favour of 
the incumbents’ politics. The RPF resumed its war and gained a mili-
tary victory in July 1994 by defeating the government forces and stop-
ping the genocide. They stated to follow the Arusha peace agreement 
and continue the political transition with the “forces” that did not par-
ticipate in the genocide in order to achieve power-sharing and demo-
cratic institutions. This initiated a second phase in the transitional pe-
riod, officially completed in 2003. 
A  mainly  top-down  assessment  of  the  Rwandan 
transition(s), its different phases and its outcome is provided by sev-
eral authors2. We complement these approaches through a bottom-up 
perspective that intents to “bring peasants back in to an understand-
ing of the political and social processes of the state.”3 We start by out-
lining a critical rethinking of the transition paradigm that brings into 
focus structural factors that impede a smooth transition to democracy. 
In our current analysis of what it means to live through a transition, a 
bottom-up perspective, we use ethnicity as pivot. Based on more than 
400 life-story interviews with both Hutu and Tutsi and their subjec-
tive well-being rankings we shed light on perceived changes over time. 
2	 On	the	Rwandan	transition	between	90-94	see:	
F.	Reyntjens,	L’Afrique	des	Grands	Lacs	en	Crise.	
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Corrosion	 of	 Statist	 Historiography	 in	 Rwanda’,	
American	Historical	Review,	2000,	p.	874.6 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
	 2.	the	trAnsItIon	PArAdIgm
The assumption underlying the main literature on political 
transitions, the so-called “transition paradigm” entails that a country 
shifting away from authoritarian rule is evolving towards democracry4. 
Through reform, compromise or overthrow – the modalities of the 
transition – do the choices of the main actors – incumbent and opposi-
tion elite forces – drive the transition towards its outcome: the new 
democracy. A reconceptualization of this classical transition paradigm 
has highlighted some major shortcomings based on the observation 
that several countries that underwent a political transition failed to 
democratize.5 Therefore, these emerging regimes - the outcome of the 
transition – need to be situated somewhere in the “grey zone”6 in-be-
tween authoritiarianism and democracy, or in either of the two corners 
of this spectrum.
Important in the understanding of reasons why countries 
failed to democratize was the observation that “structural features” 
influence or hamper efforts to democratize. These structural condi-
tions comprise historical and institutional legacies, the economic situ-
ation, social class or ethnic make-up. As a consequence, Carothers 
arguments: “Democracy promoters are strongly wedded to their focus 
on political processes and institutions. They have been concerned that 
trying to blend that focus with economic or socio-cultural perspectives 
might lead to the dilution or reduction of democracy assistance. And 
having set up as organizations with an exclusively political perspec-
tive, it is hard for democracy promotion groups to include other kinds 
of expertise or approaches.”7
Moreover, analysis of political transitions - even when 
incorporating the critical rethinking of the ‘transition paradigm’- are 
dominantly focusing on elite actions and discourses, institutional build-
up  and  procedural  regulations.  Local  perceptions  of  socio-political 
change are not mentioned in the transition literature. It is important 
that we incorporate concrete results of governance, that is, tangible life 
changes in the (perceived) well-being of the population, to understand 
the nature and in assessing the outcomes of transitions. Well-being 
includes both objective and subjective elements, so an assessment of 
indicators of change should include measures of how people feel about 
their lives and perceive the changing socio-political environment. Nar-
ratives of popular ‘agency’ and ‘perceptions’ of change are, therefore, 
a necessary ‘bottom-up’ complement to a ‘top-down’, or macro-ori-
ented understanding of a transition. Processes and mechanisms as-
sociated with a society’s attempt to shift away from old socio-politi-
cal procedures, behaviour, institutions and ideological underpinnings 
and evolve towards a new ‘order’ are operating in the context of the 
broader societal (opportunity) structure. A bottom-up perspective on 
‘transition’, therefore, entails the exploration of the dynamic interplay 
between agency and ‘opportunity’ structure.8  
4	 S.	Huntington,	The	Third	Wave:	Democratiza-







8	 Our	 discussion	 of	 “structure”	 and	 “agency”	
is	 primarily	 based	 on:	 D.	 Narayan	 (ed.)	
Empowerment	 and	 Poverty	 Reduction.	 A	
Sourcebook,	 Washington	 D.C.:	 The	 World	 Bank,	
2002,	 pp.	 xvii	 –	 xxiii.	 D.	 Narayan,	 ‘Conceptual	
Framework	and	Methodological	Challenges’	in	D.	
Narayan	 (ed.)	 Measuring	 Empowerment.	 Cross-
Disciplinary	Perspectives,	Washington	D.C.:	The	
World	Bank,	2005,	pp.	3-	38.	N.	Long,	Development	
Sociology,	 Actor	 Perspectives,	 London	 &	 New	
York:	Routledge,	2001.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 7 Living the Transition
A society’s opportunity structure is defined by the broader 
societal context being institutional, social and political; it is the formal 
and informal context in which people operate. We define institutions as 
laws, rules, norms and patterns of practices and behaviour. These can 
be formal or informal. Formal institutions include laws, rules and imple-
mentation processes mostly upheld by the state. State policies and 
the climate surrounding state institutions shape people’s actions and 
perceptions. Informal institutions include norms and values, routines of 
conduct and clusters of practices guiding everyday life and societal in-
tercourse. The opportunity structure is not only defined by institutions, 
but is also shaped by the nature of social and political structures. Agency 
and the way agency is exercised is to a large extent determined by the 
prevalent authority structures, be it political or social. These struc-
tures can be open or closed, inclusive or exclusionary, co-operative or 
conflictual. Groups can be cohesive and powerful and social cleavages 
deep and systemic. 
We define agency as the capacity of an actor to process 
- perceive and interpret -  social experiences and events and the (sub-
sequent) capability to express personal preferences and make mean-
ingful choices.9 Agency resides in a person’s assets and capabilities. 
Assets are the means people can employ in life. We understand them 
as being material: land, housing, livestock, money, etc. Capabilities are 
enabling qualities inherently belonging to a person. They can be ac-
quired during the course of life or they can be a-scripted from birth. We 
further make a distinction between: human, social, psychological and po-
litical capabilities. Under human capabilities we understand life-enhanc-
ing skills like health, education etc. Social capabilities are qualities that 
include a sense of belonging and identity, relations of trust, organiza-
tional capacities. Self-esteem and self-confidence, the ability to imag-
ine and to aspire are part of the psychological capabilities.10 And political 
capabilities are the capacities to participate in political life: represent 
oneself or others, feel represented, hold people accountable, access 
information and form associations. Agency is not only inherent in the 
individual, but is also an important feature of collectives. Groups are 
characterized by an identity and capable of organization, representa-
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	 3.	rwAndA’s	PolItICAl	trAnsItIon		 	 	
	 	 	 lIved	from	below
We analyze the features of the Rwandan political transi-
tion along the re-conceptualizations of the transition paradigm identi-
fied above. In doing so, we offer a bottom-up perspective by focusing 
on perceptions of socio-political change, while a thread and focal point 
throughout our analysis are the cleavages structuring Rwandan socie-
ty. We start with an identification of the different identity groups since 
the perception and experience of the same reality may differ depend-
ing on identity of those perceiving. Long states: “[…] Issues or events 
are, of course, often perceived, and their implications interpreted, very 
differently by the various parties/actors involved. Hence, from the out-
set one faces the dilemma of how to represent situations were there 
are multiple voices and contested ‘realities’.”11  While the Hutu-Tutsi 
divide is the central cleavage structuring the Rwandan socio-political 
universe, identities are multiple and fluid, also in the case of Rwanda. 
Our intake is the rural peasantry were we identify socio-economic 
classes and ethnic (sub-)groups. In what follows, we further explain 
the nature of the methodology used to collect the data to offer this 
bottom-up perspective. Subsequently, we outline the course of events 
as experienced by the ordinary peasant population and illustrate how 
the underlying structural factor we keep in focus, ethnicity, not only 
shaped the transition but also shapes the current perceptions of the 
Rwandan transition that started in 1990. We will finally turn to the 
outcome of the transition, that is, the perceptions of the living condi-




According to the Rwandan Ministry of Finance 56,3 % of 
the Rwandan population is identified as poor in 200712. Poverty is pre-
dominantly a rural phenomenon with 92% of the poor living in rural 
areas. Moreover, 87.2% of the entire rural based Rwandan population 
has agriculture as the main economic activity either, farming on their 
own account or working as a wage labourer. This means that the peo-
ple in the countryside dispersed over the Rwandan hills are predomi-
nantly poor and almost all peasant. 
But within this rural mass of poor peasants - only look-
ing homogeneous when observed from a distance - a lot of differentia-
tion can be made. The peasantry class has its own sub-classes char-
acterized by their peculiar social interactions. This stratification was 
especially shaped since the installation of the Second Republic from 
the seventies onwards as the monograph of a rural hill by Danielle 
11	 N.	Long,	‘Agency	and	Constraint,	Perceptions	
and	 Practice.	 A	 Theoretical	 Position’,	 in	 H.	 de	
Haan	&	N.	Long	(eds.),	Images	and	Reaities	of	
Rural	 Life.	 Wageningen	 Perspectives	 on	 Rural	
Transformations,	 Assen:	 Van	 Gorcum	 &	 Comp,	
1997,	pp.	3-4.
12	 Republic	 of	 Rwanda,	 National	 Insitute	 of	
Statistics	 ,	 Preliminary	 Poverty	 Update	 Report,	
Integrated	 Living	 Conditions	 Survey	 2005/6,	
(National	Institute	Of	Statistics:	Kigali)	December	
2006.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
de Lame makes clear in which a central theme is precisely this inter-
action between the “wage-earner” and the ordinary peasant: “The 
most striking feature of the Second Republic was, in fact, the rapid 
enrichment in monetary terms of a middle class composed of civil 
servants cum businesspeople who still maintained ties with their ru-
ral origins.”13 And: “The introduction of the political structures of the 
Second Republic provided new objectives for the ambitious. Success, 
until recently based on membership in a lineage and the defense of the 
interests of one’s house and its allies, came to integrate factors con-
nected with fortune in the modern sphere such as employment on the 
Project, selling beer to an increased number of wage-earners, directing 
the choir.”14 
The differentiation between those who have money or 
wealth that came into effect on the Rwandan hills some decades ago is 
still shaping present rural life. In the first place there is the differentia-
tion between the subsistence farmers and those who, next to their own 
agricultural production, earn a wage as civil servant in the government 
administration, the education system or the numerous development 
activities. The latter are set apart from the others by more intense mu-
tual interactions associating with each other in bars, on weddings and 
other festivities. While they mostly have enjoyed some form of edu-
cation after primary school they are considered as the ‘évolués’15  by 
the ordinary peasants, imbued with ‘ideas’ necessary for the personal 
development in life. Their level of education makes that they are often 
solicited by the administration or, if there happens to be an election 
of some sort, elected by the non-educated to execute some ‘tasks’ for 
the government; implement some development programme or take up 
some kind of ‘sensitization’ campaign.
Apart from this dominant split between those having an 
(occasional) off-farm income and those without access to regular mon-
etary income, the socio-economic differentiation is even more subtle. 
The chart below makes this clear [see figure 1]. It is important to un-
derstand these categories and the strategies for movement-up and 
mechanisms of falling-down on the social ladder because they form 
the background to understand the consequences of the violence expe-
rienced in the hills over the last fifteen years and the perceived regime 
performance in the domain of the economic recovery.
13	 D.	de	Lame,	A	Hill	Among	A	Thousand.	Trans-
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Abakire / The Rich
 They have fields, a lot of cattle and money.  They sell 
part of their production.  They have a nice house, covered 
with  concrete.  They  employ  agricultural  workers  and 
have servants.  They are educated so that they can send 
their children to school. They have the means to pay the 
tuition for the children.  They have nice clothes; you can 
see that they are all dressed up.  They are set apart in the 
neighborhood. You can see it when they arrive. With the 
means they have and their level of education they can buy 
a modern cow (cow of a better race producing more milk or 
meat) or a bicycle, a motorbike or a car. They can solve any 
problem as they know many people.
Abakungu / The Rich Without Money
They have a lot of fields and cattle. A big and beautiful 
house, even with some servants. But they have no sala-
ried job or only a small salary. They sometimes run a small 
business.  But, nevertheless, they can have money as they 
sell part of their production, as they have enough provi-
sions. In the family they can have wage-earning children 
as they have gone to school.
Abakene Bifashije / The Poor With Means
Somebody that has a house and a field with minimum one 
or two cows. They have a not too bad production.  They 
live from their own harvest and seldom work for others. 
What is lacking is money.  It are people that can hold out 
in  difficult  periods  as  they  have  something  and  cattle.  
When there is a serious problem, they can sell something 
or part of the production to solve the problem.  They  can 
even go to the bank as they have something to mortgage 
( cattle, fields etc.) It are people who have no education. 
They know how to live but they have no training.  Between 
them, there are some that have money but they do not 
do anything with it as they have no education. They are 
happy with their possessions, but they do not think of the 
future.
Abakene / The Poor
They have parcels of land, but insufficient. Their fields are 
not productive.  But they might have some cattle.  But only 
small cattle (a goat or a sheep), sometimes only one single 
animal, not more. As they do not have that much money, 
they occasionally work for others. They do agricultural 
work when there are problems like a drought. They some-
times have enough to eat as they have gone to the market, 
but they have no stocks. When they have credit, it comes 
from neighbours or friends. They have a house but they do 
not often have the occasion of having cash money.
Abatindi / The Vulnerable
At least they have a small field, but not productive. It are 
people living from work in others’ fields. They have a bit 
of arable land, but with an insufficient harvest. They do 
not have cattle. They have a house, but not a comfortable 
one. They try to strike an alliance with people that have 
something in order to have something to eat.
Abatindi Nyakujya / The Most Vulnerable
It are people that have almost nothing; they do not have 
land nor fields.  Even the house is almost devastated or 
they do not have a house at all. It are people that wear 
dirty and torn clothes, having no food.  They are marginal. 
They have an inferiority complex towards others.  It is 
difficult for them to be with others. Given their situation, 
they can not be together with others. They live thanks 
to what they ask others. They are agricultural workers or 
sometimes persons without strength not able to go cul-
tivate the fields of others. There is nobody that can help 
them.
These  people  have  enough  fields  and 
cattle.    In  this  way  they  can  acquire 
money and open a bank account.  When 
they have got an idea, they can ask for a 
credit at the bank to raise their level to 
that of the rich. On this level, they be-
gin to have ideas and education so that 
they can send their children to school.  
Their  behaviour  changes  as  well  as 
their clothes.
What he is lacking is money.  When he 
finds it, he can practise agriculture or 
modern cattle breeding. He has a cer-
tain education, so he can ask for a credit 
at the bank to start up a project.
The  umukene  (sing.)  has  cattle  and 
thanks to the manure he can maintain 
his fields. But also, when he sells cattle, 
he can buy another plot of land. In that 
way he continues to improve his stand-
ard of living. With the growing produc-
tion he can pay visits and have contacts 
with the Abakire. After a certain time 
he can buy a bicycle and he gets better 
socially integrated and receives ideas 
thanks to the contacts. If he succeeds 
in getting a training in modern agricul-
ture, he can get the means to set up a 
small breeding project
An  umutindi  (sing.)  can  get  the  op-
portunity  to  tend  a  cow  or  a  goat  of 
somebody for a certain time.  The first 
offspring is for the owner, but the sec-
ond is for the one that tends. The cow 
is given because this person has grazed 
it. In this way he can move up.  As there 
is collaboration between the Abatindi 
and the Abakene, the umutindi can per-
ceive how the Abakene work and he can 
have ideas.
If someone does not have the strength 
to work the fields, if he does not have a 
hoe and if he finds a hoe, he might have 
the  opportunity  to  climb  to  another 
level. So, if there are means to change 
things,  one  can  have  the  opportunity 
that  something  happens.  Someone 
wants to rent a field for instance.  In 
that  way  he  can  climb  the  ladder.  If 
he succeeds in getting an agricultural 
project, if he can have cattle, he might 
have  the  means  to  obtain  his  private 
home.  It is only possible if someone 
renders assistance.
They  can  also  fall  if  they  lose  their 
wage-work.  But also because of other 
reasons.    For  instance:  the  umukire 
owns a lot of property and has a big 
production, that big that he can squan-
der it. But he has got a lot of children 
to send to school and that can be the 
cause of  his degradation. 
He can fall but not more that one step 
on the ladder as he has fields and cat-
tle. A rich person can have a project and 
ask money from the bank.  If it does not 
work, he has to pay interest.  When the 
bank comes, he has to sell a vehicle or a 
field.  He can have a business, but if the 
business does not flourish he can go 
bankrupt and fall.  The loss of property 
(cow,  plot,  wealth),  the  death  of  the 
spouse also cause a fall.
For instance, if there are children help-
ing the household to produce or to im-
prove the conditions of life.  But if the 
children leave the household, it loses 
its strength.  He can not go down and 
fall different levels. He can have prob-
lems because of the circle of acquaint-
ances, other persons in the sector that 
are jealous and can attack him. There 
are always persons on the lookout to 
make sure a person does not reach his 
goal.  The loss of property (cow, plot, 
wealth), the death of the spouse also 
cause a fall.
The loss of property (cow, plot, wealth), 
the death of the spouse and drought 
or flooding can bring about a descent 
to a lower level. This person can have 
problems, but particularly because of 
climatic changes.  He can start selling 
what he has to survive.  Therefore, he 
can change level. Studying cost a lot. 
Thus, if a child has to go to high school, 
he can drop a level if he does not find 
external  help.  Or  it  can  be  someone 
Someone having the strength to work 
but  that  does  not  want  to  work.  If 
there is no will to do efforts.  He can 
also spend more than he produces.  He 
can also have problems because of the 
climatic  conditions  and  begin  to  sell, 
lose strength and have a lack of self 
confidence  and  go  down.  The  loss  of 
property (cow, plot, wealth), the death 
of the spouse and drought or flooding 
can bring about a descent to a lower 
level.




Figure 1    Socio-Economic ProfilesIOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 11 Living the Transition
Apart  from  the  differentiation  according  to  socio-eco-
nomic profile ethnicity is another aspect that structures interaction in 
the texture of social life in Rwanda. De Lame states that ethnicity was 
only a minor factor in daily life at the end of the eighties, the period in 
which she undertook fieldwork: “[…] membership in an ethnic group 
seemed more to be a discriminatory criterion for the political appara-
tus than an essential part of peasant’s everyday life. The real situa-
tion as perceived by the latter was that they were more or less poor, 
irrespective of their ethnic group, and at the mercy of richer people, 
most of whom were Hutu, and secondly, that access to education was 
carefully – and ethnically – guarded.”16 The basic socio-economic ine-
quality she found existing between the peasantry, as explained above, 
was cross-cutting all three ethnic groups – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. An 
economic inequality that could find an easy outlet through the lens of 
ethnicity when starting to provoke resentment.17
Whereas the influence of ethnicity might have been only 
to a small extent present in the period preceeding the 1990 attack by 
the RPF, it did structure the nature of the violence during the genocide 
and it is certainly structuring daily life currently, although paradoxical-
ly, ethnicity is ‘officially’ abolished. But since 1994, new identities have 
come into play. They are subcategories of the main cleavage dominat-
ing Rwandan society: the Hutu-Tutsi bi-polarity. New identity markers 
came into being due to the violence and its aftermath and the judicial 
proceedings to deal with the past, mainly in the Gacaca sessions.18 
The group of Tutsi can be divided in genocide survivors and 
‘old caseload returnees’. The former lived in Rwanda before the geno-
cide and survived the mayhem. The latter are either former refugees 
or descendants of refugees that left Rwanda after the Hutu revolution. 
They often settled in cities after their return to Rwanda. Others, ordi-
nary peasants, mostly returned to their region of (family) origin. The 
survivors are almost always of Tutsi identity, with only a few excep-
tions.19 Fieldwork observations make clear that there are, in general, 
three defining parameters necessary to be able to make a legitimate 
claim as victim seeking justice for ‘wrong done’ in the Gacaca courts:20 
one needs to have undergone persecution – not simply ‘having lost’ - 
between October 1990 and December 1994; a persecution because 
of having a certain identity; an ‘identity-based’ persecution because 
of belonging to the Tutsi as ethnic group that makes one currently an 
officially recognized survivor. 
On the side of the Hutu, four groups can be distinguished 
in a local community. Firstly, there are the prisoners whom are ab-
sent in daily village life and are only transported to the village when 
their own trial takes place. Their families are present however and ap-
proach Gacaca as a means to get their loved ones free. A community 
also contains liberated prisoners. They have confessed in prison and 
16	 D.	de	Lame,	op.	cit..,	p.	94
17	 D.	de	Lame,	op.	cit.,	p.	97.




Learning	 From	 African	 Experiences	 (Stockholm:	
International	 Idea),	 2007.	 B.	 Ingelaere,	 “Does	
the	Truth	Pass	Across	the	Fire	without	Burning?”	
Transitional	 Justice	 and	 Its	 Discontents	 in	
Rwanda’s	 Gacaca	 Courts,	 Discussion	 Paper,	
Institute	of	Development	Policy	and	Management,	
University	of	Antwerp,	2007.
19	 There	 exceptions	 can	 be,	 for	 example,	 Hutu	
widows	who	were	married	to	a	Tutsi	are	regularly	
also	 considered	 as	 official	 rescapé,	 genocide	
survivors.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 female	 Tutsi,	
married	 with	 a	 Hutu	 are	 often	 not	 recognized	
as	official	survivor	since	they	were	married	to	a	
Hutu	 and	 therefore	 so-called	 protected.	 Most	
of	the	time,	the	recognition	as	survivor	depends	
on	 local	 dynamics	 since	 some	 members	 of	 the	







20	See	 a	 similar	 reasoning	 for	 the	 defining	
characteristics	 of	 victim/rescapé	 entitled	 for	
government	 or	 NGO	 assistance.	 H.	 Rombouts,	
Victim	 Organisations	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	
Reparation.	A	Case	Study	on	Rwanda,,	(Antwerp:	
Intersentia,	2005,	p.	149.12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
were therefore released. They are closely monitored by authorities. 
Often they play an important role in the Gacaca proceedings by accus-
ing fellow villagers, Hutu that have never been imprisoned but were 
somehow implicated in the genocide. This can create serious conflicts 
between them and those they accuse. Outright intimidation or more 
subtle means are employed to silence or to forge an alliance with them. 
The same tactics are used to influence the behaviour of the genocide 
survivors. Sometimes killings take place to get rid of witnesses. A part 
from the (former) prisoners, two Hutu subgroups remain: those ac-
cused in Gacaca and others not accused. The first live in the fear and 
insecurity of an upcoming trial with an unpredictable outcome, the 
second group is relieved that they are not accused, but are very pru-
dent not to get in conflict with anyone since they are aware that cur-
rent conflicts can be dragged into the Gacaca arena to be settled under 
the guise of an alleged genocide crime.
		 3.2	 	Fieldwork	&	Methodology
Our research wants to understand (the experience and 
perceptions of) processes of transition and regime change. Rwanda’s 
political transition started in 1990. We, therefore, needed the ability 
to capture dynamics over a longer period, not only an understanding 
of the current situation. Moreover, we needed to come to an under-
standing of the perceived comparison of the subsequent regimes with-
out asking respondents explicit questions to do so. Direct questions 
of this kind by foreign researchers are not only ‘unwanted’ by the 
Rwandan political establishment and administrative authorities, they 
would also mainly trigger ‘politically correct’ answers by respondents. 
The violence experienced during the 1994 genocide and war has de-
stroyed the Rwandan social fabric, distrust is pervasive. An environ-
ment where people experienced or participated in different forms of 
violence, is not the context where you can make clear-cut observations 
and impetuously ‘collect’ info to subsequently proceed with a univocal 
analysis and generalization. The following zealous combat to eradi-
cate ‘genocide ideology’21, equally counters all utterances not in ac-
cordance with the official “public transcript”22 and has installed a high 
degree of self-censorship among the peasant population.23 Therefore, 
we integrated the following principles and research strategies in de-
signing the  study and during fieldwork: (1) an inductive ‘theoretical 
drive’ and an ‘iterative’ research process; (2) making observations on 
both the community (village/sector) and the individual level; (3) un-
derstanding the breadth and the depth of processes; (4) making use 
of a rigid sampling framework in order to have variance in the sites for 
in-depth study (multi-sited); (5) combining quantitative & qualitative 
research strategies (mixed method); (6) the ability to capture dynam-
ics of change by adopting a diachronic perspective.24
21	 Republic	 of	 Rwanda,	 Genocide	 Ideology	 and	












24	The	 overall	 research	 design	 and	 strategy	 is	
further	 explained	 in	 B.	 Ingelaere,	 Transitional	
Subjects/Subjects	in	Transition:	Exploring	Political	
Transition	 and	 Transtional	 Justice	 from	 Below.	
A	 Note	 On	 Methodology.	 Discussion	 Paper,	
Institute	of	Development	Policy	and	Management,	
University	of	Antwerp,	2008.	(forthcoming)	IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 1 Living the Transition
		3.2.1	 Life	history	interviews	and	a	subjective	ranking
		 	 exercise
To avoid the pitfalls identified above and to live up to the 
research principles identified above, we approached the topic ‘side-
ways’, by collecting life histories and subjective well-being and pover-
ty rankings.25 In so doing, respondents were not aware that they were 
not only telling their own story, but equally the story of (a political) 
transition and regime change.
In 2006, during a pilot period for the life story interviews, 
we conducted 50 full life-story interviews with 30 Hutu respondents 
and 20 Tutsi respondents from several villages. These interviews were 
conducted during several sessions with each respondent and through 
open-ended questions touching on every aspect of the interviewee’s 
life. These initial life-story interviews lasted in total between 7 and 14 
hours (several sessions). Based on an analysis of these narratives we 
deduced a set of questions to be used during shorter interview ses-
sions that would take between 1,5 and 3 hours so we could use them 
with a larger sample of respondents. These questions would allow us 
to probe into crucial aspects of a member of the Rwandan peasantry 
life trajectory. We further grouped these questions into 5 themes that 
correspond with the different dimensions that matter in life for ‘ordi-
nary’ people as identified above: the socio-economic situation, the 
feeling of security, the level of confidence in others (with a subsection 
for the own ethnic group and the other ethnic group), the feeling of po-
litical representation and the personal prospects for the future.26 An 
analysis of these numerous life-story narratives enables us to under-
stand what it means to live through a transition, a period of violence 
and from one regime into another. But apart from this ‘qualitative’ or 
‘ethnographic’ research strategy, we added a ‘quantitative’ element to 
the exercise. 
During each life story interview we used a “visual” to fa-
cilitate the respondents in the assessment of different periods in the 
life span.27 [See figure 2]  We asked this for the different themes identi-
fied above: the socio-economic situation, the feeling of security and 
the level of confidence in others and the feeling of political representa-
tion. In the life story interviews a value between -5 and +5 was given 
(by the respondent) through pointing on the appropriate step on the 
ladder for every year in the adult life period. 
We proceeded as follows. First, the nature of the visual 
was explained: on top of the ladder are those people who are the best 
of (economy), the most secure (security), etc in the community of the re-
spondent. Otherwise, the problem would exist that people would com-
pare themselves with residents of Kigali, obliging them (in their per-
ception) always to choose for the bottom steps. The spatial reference 
25	Apart	 from	 the	 life	 story	 interviews	 and	
subjective	 (poverty)	 rankings	 we	 present	 in	
this	paper,	we	employed	several	other	research	
strategies,	 survey	 interviews,	 semi-structured	
interview,	focus	group	discussions	on	a	number	of	
themes,	archival	research,	observation	of	dialy	life,	
political	 organization	 and	 Gacaca	 activities.	 In	
total,	we	spoke	with	over	1400	ordinary	peasant.
26	The	 above-mentioned	 ‘capabilities’	 can	 be	
considered	as	dimensions	of	life	that	matter	for	
ordinary	 people.	 They	 are	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	
findings	from	a	large-scale	research	that	aimed	
at	establishing	the	different	dimensions	of	‘well-
being’	 and	 the	 ‘good	 life’.	 These	 are	 ‘material’,	
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is the own community, in our field sites always rural with dominantly 
peasant inhabitants. With communities, we refer to sectors. There 
exist no villages in Rwanda. People live dispersed on the hills in the 
country-side and are grouped in administrative units. We define the 
local level, a local community, as the proximity of people’s everyday 
lives. This happens at the cell and sector level as they existed before 
the administrative restructuring of January 2006.
When the geographical area for comparison was defined 
and the people on the top step characterized (step  +5), the nature of 
the bottom step was further explained as ‘people’ who are ‘the worst 
off in economic terms’ (step  -5) or ‘feel the least secure’, or ‘are the 
least confident in the other ethnic group’ / or the ‘own ethnic group’, or 
‘feel the least politically represented’ in the community. The enumera-
tors and my translator were ‘trained’ (and supervised) always to use 
exactly the same phrasings to explain the nature of the ladder and 
its steps in order to avoid a heterogeneous interpretation by the re-
spondents. Equally important is the fact that all respondents have a 
similar understanding of the situation/feelings/concepts of ‘economic 
prosperity’, ‘security’, ‘confidence’ and ‘political representation’. We 
always first asked the respondent to describe in his/her own words 
how he/she interpreted the notion ‘economic situation’, the ‘feeling 
of security’, the degree of ‘confidence’ and the nature of ‘political rep-
resentation’. Although their responses make clear that these notions 
comprise multiple characteristics and one respondent might pay more 
attention to one dimension over another one, their phrasings explain-
ing the themes indicate that all are aware of the range of connotation 
a notion entails. Gradual continuity prevails in the semantic under-
standing of the notions under exploration, there is no difference in kind 
in the interpretations. We explain these semantics in section 3.2.2.
Subsequently,  the  respondents  were  asked  to  place 
themselves with regard to the topic discussed (economy, security, …) 
on the ladder in their current situation. We then consistently moved 
back in time towards the year of marriage or the first year of adult life 
(if single). From that point onwards, we moved forward in time, asking 
a rating for every year.  We used the findings from the life-story narra-
tive to facilitate people to recall their situation at a certain moment in 
time. For example, when someone had told us he or she had a firstborn 
child in 1986, we would refer to 1986 as ‘the year when your first child 
was born’.
It needs to be noted that the scale (ladder) itself remains 
fixed throughout the different periods in time. The fact that the scale 
remains fixed needs further explanation. For example, we have ex-
plained the difference in socio-economic classes in figure 1. The dif-
ferent groups such the umutindi, umukene and umukire etc always exist 
when considering the (sub-)groups as such. Even when a certain vil-IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 1 Living the Transition
lage (at a certain point in time) does not contain, for example, house-
holds with the characteristics of the umukire, then the idea and knowl-
edge of what it means to be umukire is still known to the inhabitants. A 
similar reasoning is made by the respondent when applying the scale 
for other then socio-economic themes such as the feeling of security 
or the level of political representation. Also in these cases is there an 
idea, understanding of what it means to be ‘fully’ represented, ‘totally 
secure’ or the flip-side situations. The scale functions as a mental map 
and background against which the personal movement up and down 
the ladder of life – the imaginary but stable situations/levels of the 
theme explored - is assessed related to a certain theme and in time and 
in comparison with the surrounding environment: the fellow commu-
nity members, also moving on the ladder of life. Furthermore, as can 
be seen again in figure 1, enough differentiation exists between differ-
ent groups/situations of economic prosperity (but also security/confi-
dence/political representation) to allow for sufficient choice options. 
Important to note is that these narratives and rankings 
are not indicators of economic welfare, social cohesion, security and 
political representation, but indicators of perceptions of these themes. 
Equally important in interpreting these findings is the fact that these 
results portray rankings over time: events and periods in the past are 
reinterpreted through the lens of events happening later and during 
following life periods. The functioning of memory and the effects of 
trauma,  and  current  governmental  campaigns  to  adjust  the  under-
standing of the past in nation-building strategies creates bias in the 
response of the ranking exercise. However, several elements need to 
be taken into account. In the first place: there are no baseline data 
available on these topics, recall is the best to get at these issues. Sec-
ondly, we want to understand the experience and perceptions of tran-
sition and this is how perceptions work: they are influenced by indi-
vidual experiences in the past and mediated by discourses produced by 
the government, media and other instances, past and present. It is an 
element to take into account when interpreting and presenting the re-
sults of the rankings. And fourth: bias that might exist due to the recall 
activity goes in all directions: all respondents are subject to it.
	3.2.2	 Semantics,	or	what	does	it	all	mean:
		 	 security,	confidence,	political	representation?
What the ordinary Rwandan understands when consid-
ering the socio-economic situation of himself, his household and the 
neighbouring households is explained above in figure 1. When asked 
to explain what is understood under the feeling of security or confi-
dence in others, often a reference is made to the heart (umutima). In 
the Rwandan context, the heart is the force unifying the human being. 16 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
It is the centre of reception of outward impulses and the locus of inte-
rior movement, the seed of the interior. Emotions, thoughts and will 
are interconnected and unified in the heart. The heart is inaccessible 
to others, but nevertheless the place where the truth lies.28 A Rwan-
dan peasant feels secure when the heart is calm and peaceful. Having 
peace of heart (umutuzo w’umutima), and thus feeling secure, is only 
possible when several conditions are met. Security (umutekano) has 
different dimensions. There is the security of the stomach (umutekano 
w’inda), security of the body (persons) and goods (umutekano w’abantu 
n’ibintu) The latter is fulfilled when one sleeps well (ununtu araryama 
agasinzira). There is a clear distinction between ‘territorial’ or ‘physical’ 
security and ‘psychological’ security. Territorial security is guaranteed 
when there is no war (ntambara) or conflicts (imidugararo) among the 
population. One can freely move around (kujya aho ushaka), cultivate 
the plots of land or breed cattle in freedom (uburenganzira). Territorial 
security is in the hands of the authorities and politicians. But this is no 
guarantee for economic sufficiency, security of the stomach. Poverty, 
the lack of food, hunger and the awareness that one is not capable to 
adequately counter sickness or pay the tuition fee for the children, cre-
ates a feeling of insecurity. Other intra-household problems, setbacks 
or conflicts contribute to a decrease in the feeling of security. Territo-
rial security is no guarantee either for feeling at ease in the social and 
political climate in which one lives. The experience of the nature of the 
social constellation and the perception of the overall power structure 
and the functioning of the political order contribute to the increase or 
decrease of the feeling of security. The feeling that authorities are not 
on your side, that state policies are not applied equally and without 
arbitrariness creates the perception that one is targeted, one feels as 
if “they are aiming to do you wrong” (Kukwirunkankiraho). The lack of 
social cohesion and worries about the intention of some members of 
the living community further disturbs the peace of heart.
The heart is equally referred to in the context of confi-
dence in others. Confidence in others is observable through actions 
and interactions in daily life. Amicable salutations and pleasant con-
versations are already a first sign of general trust in another person. 
But to really be confident in others, one needs to be sure about the 
nature of the heart of the other. But “the heart of man is far” (Kumu-
tima w’umuntu ni kure) and thus inaccessible. Apart from the tacit ex-
ploration of the heart of the other in daily interactions do actions that 
go beyond the routine of daily life probe the nature of the heart of the 
other. These actions can be: inviting people to attend ceremonies of 
conviviality  (dusabana  and  dusangira).  Or  through  interventions  and 
support by others when problems arise in the family due to sickness, 
death or other misfortune; by sharing foods and drinks, water and fire. 
Aid can be material (gufashanya) though money, a donation or shar-
ing but it can also be moral (gutabarana) with the physical presence in 
28	See	also:	Pierre	Crepeau,	Paroles	et	Sagesse.	
Valeurs	Sociales	dans	les	Proverbes	du	Rwanda,	
(Tervuren,	 Musée	 Royal	 de	 l’Afrique	 Centrale,	
1985),	154-155.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 17 Living the Transition
times of distress. Confidence is manifested when secrets are shared 
and confidentiality is kept, while speaking the truth (ukuri) is equally 
an important element in relations of trust. But truth and lies stand in 
a dialectial relationship. Communication is a function of forging alli-
ances in a complex socio-political universe, not necessarily a means to 
describe reality.29
 An analysis of peasant narratives indicates that there are 
two understandings or dimensions to political representation. Politi-
cal representation (guhagarirwa) in its most basic understanding in the 
Rwandan countryside comes down to the idea of being able to send 
someone to a meeting or a decision-taking body where this person 
will also defend your interests. It is about how one is represented. It 
entails the idea that authorities are aware of the living situation, the 
problems and well-being of the represented through almost personal 
contact, that they know “how you are doing” and can transfer a mes-
sage to authorities higher up if necessary. It is about being aware and 
taking care of the needs of the population. One is further represented 
when (territorial) security is guaranteed and conflicts are solved. An 
additional dimension of political representation is related to how one 
represents, how one governs. It is about the way power is exercised. It 
is about governing in an impartial way, preventing the suffering of any 
kind of injustice that remains unpunished (Kugukosereza); that one is 
not the object of any form of violenct behaviour (Guhohoterwa). Even 
more important is that the governed do not suffer from prejudice and 
injustice emanating from the administration itself, those who govern; 
that no one is impeding you of reaching your goal (Ukubangamira). A 
preliminary condition to feel represented is that one does not feel tar-
geted by those exercising power, that one has not the impression “all 
means are employed to do you bad” (Kukwirunkankiraho).
3.2.3	 The	selection	of	communities	(sectors)	and
		 	 respondents
The selection of communities (sectors) was guided by the 
principle of attaining maximum variance.30 The idea was to select con-
texts as widely diverging as possible on different levels: demographic 
and ethnic composition; historical bases of power; conflict history and 
intensity of violence. Maximizing variance helps to sharpen patterns, 
make recurring themes emerge and establish findings significant for a 
wide range of environments. The selection of provinces was based on 
an extensive literature review and the expertise of informed observers. 
We selected the (former) provinces Ruhengeri, Kigali-Ngali, Gitarama 
and Kibungo. We selected a range of communities at random within 
the above-mentioned provinces where we collected basic demograph-
ic information on the community and data on the events during the pe-
riod of war, genocide and the aftermath and administered a survey for 
29	See	on	this	topic	:	Aloys	Rukebesha,	Esotérisme	
et	Communication	Sociale,	(Kigali,	1985).	Cornelis	
M.	 Overdulve,	 “Fonction	 de	 la	 langue	 ed	 de	 la	
communication	au	Rwanda”,	NeueZeitschrift	für	
Missionswissenschaft,	 53,	 N°4,	 1997,	 271-283.	 ;	
Charles	 Ntampaka,	 «	 Vérité	 et	 Opinion	 Dans	
la	 Société	 Rwandaise	 Traditionelle	 »,	 Dialogue,	
N°	 221,	 3-24.	 The	 search	 for	 the	 truth	 and	 the	
nature	 of	 communication	 is	 a	 central	 theme	 in	
B.	 Ingelaere,	 “Does	 the	 Truth	 Pass	 Across	 the	
Fire	 without	 Burning?”	 Transitional	 Justice	 and	
Its	 Discontents	 in	 Rwanda’s	 Gacaca	 Courts,	
Discussion	Paper,	Institute	of	Development	Policy	
and	Management,	University	of	Antwerp,	2007.
30	A	 procedure	 modeled	 on	 the	 work	 of,	 for	
example,	A.	Varshney,	Ethnic	Conflict	and	Civic	
Life.	Hindus	and	Muslims	in	India,	(New	Haven	
&	 London:	 Yale	 University	 Press:	 2002).	 Or:	
C.	 Gibson	 &	 M.	 Woolcock,	 Empowerment	 and	
Local	 Level	 Conflict	 Mediation	 in	 Indonesia:	 A	
Comparative	 Analysis	 of	 Concepts,	 Measures,	
and	Project	Efficacy,	World	Bank	Policy	Research	
Working	Paper	3713,	(Washington	D.C.:	The	World	
Bank,	2005).1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
key informants. Maximizing variance was also crucial in the selection of 
communities for in-depth study (life-story interviews) in each province, 
again to sharpen patterns in different contexts. We collected data on 
the number of people killed during the genocide to classify communi-
ties.31 We argue that the ‘death toll’ is a good indication of the ‘shock’ 
a community needs to overcome on the economic, legal, human, mate-
rial, social and psychological level. The classification of communities 
was  then  based  on  available 
statistical  data  –  the  number 
of  community  residents  killed 
and  further  supported  by  the 
information  delivered  by  key 
informants.  Within  this  clas-
sification  we  purposively  se-
lected  six  communities  in  or-
der to attain maximal variance 
for  in-depth  study.  Table  7  in 
annex  provides  an  overview 
of the main demographic and 
historical characteristics of the 
6  communities  (sectors).  The 
variance  in  field  sites  allows 
for an indicative apprehension 
of  life  experiences  incorporat-
ing various dynamics of historical events, state and societal practices. 
Field sites are highlighted on the map. Big dots are locations where 
life histories were collected, small dots are locations were we equally 
resided (but using other research techniques). The six locations do not 
allow us to claim national representativity. However, the guiding prin-
ciples applied when chosing the research locations and in the selec-
tion of respondents allow for indicative findings and a grounded un-
derstanding.
Varshney summarizes the problem of different methodo-
logical approaches as “those who sample rarely collect oral histories, 
and those who collect oral histories rarely sample their respondents.”32 
In his study on ethnic conflict in India he nevertheless has shown that 
transcending  the  methodological  divide  and  integrating  both  ap-
proaches yields extraordinary results. We therefore selected respond-
ents through stratified random sampling. Rwanda is an ethnic bi-polar 
society, with Hutu and Tutsi as the main ethnic groups. Nevertheless, 
due to the violence, ‘new’ groups have emerged. During our fieldwork 
we determined, as explained above, 5 social groups that are clearly 
identified by local inhabitants. Tutsi inhabitants can be divided into 
‘genocide survivors’ and ‘old-caseload returnees’. The latter or their 
parents fled Rwanda after the Hutu-revolution in 1959 and returned 
31	 These	 data	 were	 gathered	 by	 consulting	 the	
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to Rwanda after the take over of power in 1994. The group of Hutu in 
a local setting currently contains released prisoners, those accused in 
Gacaca and those who are not accused and have never been imprisoned. 
We compiled lists with the names of all the household heads in the 
selected village and asked several groups of key informants to iden-
tify every household according to one of the five group characteristics. 
Subsequently, we randomly selected households within each group to 
interview the head of the household or his wife with approximately 70 
respondents in every locality.33 Selected persons with the age lower 
than 30 were systematically replaced. Respondents needed to have 
lived through the transition and regime change in a conscious way. We 
aggregated the weighted results for each of the five groups across all 
communities into a tendency according to ethnic group, Hutu or Tutsi, 
and subgroup. We first resided in one of the communties between July 
and September 2004 and later in all of them for a certain period be-
tween January and July 2006. Between January and June 2005, brief 
visits were made to some of the communities while working on anoth-
er research project in Rwanda. Life-story interviews were conducted 
between January and April 2007, while we resided for shorter periods 
in the sectors.
  Table 1  Identity Respondents Life-Story Interviews
Male Female Total
Hutu Not Accused in Gacaca / Never Incarcerated 74 62 136
Hutu Accused in Gacaca 68 9 77
Hutu Released Prisoner 58 0 58
Total Hutu 200 71 271
Tutsi Survivor 36 49 85
Tutsi Old-Caseload Returnee 28 25 53
Total Tutsi 64 74 138
All Respondents 264 145 409
3.2.4	Interviewers
All  of  the  life  story  interviews  were  conducted  by  the 
author, together with 5 Rwandan field assistants. The interviewers 
were selected based on their previous experience with participation 
in survey and qualitative research, their capacity to reside in rural 
communities and skill in interaction with the peasant population. The 
enumerators were not inhabitants of the communities. They received 
a training of several days on the contents of the life story interviews 
and overall fieldwork principles (selection of respondents – introduc-
tion – behaviour towards respondents – etc.). The life stories were col-
lected in each community with all enumerators present and the author 
as supervisor.
33	Some	communities	did	not	have	old	caseload	
returnees,	others	didn’t	have	released	prisoners.20 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
With each interview (both from the author and the field 
assistants) a general introduction on the origin and aim of the study 
was given. It was explained that the study was conducted by a ‘uni-
versity student from Belgium’ and dealt with ‘post-conflict reconstruc-
tion’.  It was highlighted that we had the permission from both national 
and local authorities to conduct the research. We always stressed the 
fact that we were not connected or working for the government. Ano-
nymity and voluntary participation was stressed and, if desired, the 4 
permissions from the Rwandan ministries were shown. All individual 
interviews were administered in the house of the respondent. 
The  interviews  were  translated  from  Kinyarwanda  to 
French by a field-assistant/translator. The interviewers wrote down 
expressions in Kinyarwanda with a specific meaning surpassing imme-
diate possibility of translation. These were discussed afterwards and 
compared with the translated statements. All interviews were later 
typed out by another assistant, who would also annotate the inter-
views when faced with particularities related to translation of state-
ments from Kinyarwanda. We did not use recording devices since re-
spondents are not familiarized with them and they arouse suspicion 
and possibly a reservation in response. 
3.2.5	 A	Note	on	Presentation:	Interlocking	Realities
Graphs 1 to 4 present the aggregated results of a subjec-
tive ranking exercise according to ethnic (sub-)group. These perceived 
changes enable us to discern differences and similarities in percep-
tions according to ethnic identity. In doing so, we depict the perceived 
changing nature of the type of regime and its policies through the lens 
of ethnicity. For each phase of the transition we also include excerpts 
from  peasant  narratives  to  elucidate  the  perceived  socio-political 
changes over time by the ordinary Rwandan populace. We used the re-
sults of the ranking exercise as presented in the graphs to explore the 
extensive amount of life story narratives and identify recurring themes 
and underlying motifs. Focusing on the subjective ranking exercise, we 
analyze the nature of the perceived changes throughout the life trajec-
tory. We juxtapose Hutu and Tutsi narratives to portray diverging and 
converging experiences. These narrative blocs and threads, in their 
turn, support and elucidate the nature of the results of the ranking 
exercise. We describe the perceived changes while using short quotes 
from the life story narratives to support our arguments in the interpre-
tation of the results of the ‘ladder of life’ ranking exercise. We take a 
chronological stance and according to the findings, 4 periods can be 
identified: 1980s-1994; 1994-2000; 2000-2005 and the current situ-
ation from 2005 onwards.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 21 Living the Transition
The graphs and the ‘ethnic’ quotes are the master devices 
used to portray the experience and perception of ‘transition’. Even 
though Rwanda is a bi-polar ethnic society with ethnicity as the mas-
ter cleavage structuring historical events, the danger of reification ex-
ists when reducing the complexity of identity to binary ethnic markers 
and subsuming a variety of experiences under two ethnic categories. 
Moreover, the aggregation of the rankings across communities and 
individuals deprives lived reality of its richness in detail and particu-
larism, both on the community and the individual level. Every social 
setting is marked by idiosyncrasies. The use of large-scale surveys 
avoids those idiosyncrasies by reducing the complexity of reality and 
producing universally valid predictions and statements. On the other 
hand, in-depth ethnographic research – through for example life-sto-
ry interviews - generates information very rich in detail and is able to 
identify underlying patterns and themes that will not surface by us-
ing solely a ranking exercise. The technique of assembling quotes in 
a montage or panel does not do justice to the depth and coherence of 
an entire life story or the particularity of a specific locality. In both the 
presentation of the graphs as in the selected quotations is this dimen-
sion lacking. Therefore, the master narrative needs to be anchored in 
other dimensions. 
We therefore present four extended (life) stories in an ex-
emplary fashion in text boxes 1 to 4 in annex. One from an old Hutu 
men, another from a released and confessed (Hutu) prisoner and also 
the story of both a Hutu and Tutsi genocide survivor. All are living in 
the same village, Ntabona, in central Rwanda.34 We also present the 
history of this community juxtaposed with the history of another com-
munity, both by recounting the past and presenting the graphs depict-
ing the ranking results on the level of the community. For lack of space, 
we present two snapshots, specific moments in time. On the one hand 
the descriptive account of the events in 1994, on the other hand vil-
lage life and the justice-development-governance nexus in the post-
genocide era with a specific focus on the Gacaca activities.
One additional dimension is captured in tables 2, 3 and 4 
summarizing the regime attributes at different moments in the political 
transition. We consider a political regime to be a system of government 
determined by procedural, ideological and/or behavioural attributes. 
Regime change can take place when there is a procedural, ideological 
and/or behavioural change.35 We discern 4 moments according to the 
‘officially’ proclaimed transitional phases: the Habyarimana regime 
(1973-1990); the Habyarimana regime in transition (1990-1994) and 
the provisional and consolidated post-genocide regime (1994-2003 & 
2003-2007). We summarize the regime attributes during these differ-
ent phases to provide an overall macro framework in which to situate 
the bottom-up perspective presented here.
34	The	 names	 of	 villages	 and	 individuals	 are	
changed	to	ensure	confidentiality.	
35	See	M.	Rafti,	op.	cit,	2007.22 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
		 3.3	 Perceived	Changes	over	Time
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  Graph 3  Subjective Ranking  Perceived Level of Confidence
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3.3.1	 1980s	–	1994
Through  the  subjective  ranking,  it  becomes  clear  that 
both Hutu and Tutsi, valued the level of well-being during the 80s, at 
the height of the Habyarimana regime.At least when looking back, in 
their current perception. Food as well as territorial security were guar-
anteed. The ranking by Tutsi is slightly lower, especially in regard to 
the level of confidence towards the other ethnic group and the per-
ception of the nature of political representation: a consequence of the 
awareness that their group had been targeted in the past, as they re-
membered from the experience of the events of 1959, 1963-1964 and 
1973. This was more a latent awareness of not being fully represented 
due to the ruling of the great majority (rubanda nyamwinshi), being de 
facto the Hutu majority. Hutu don’t make a distinction between their 
own group and Tutsi for that period. Trust was omnipresent for them, 
without distinction. Tutsi living outside of Rwanda at that time, were 
less confident in Hutu. Tutsi genocide survivors recall: 
Tutsi
“During that period, the government equally did its utmost to guarantee the peace of the population, evidently they called us Tutsi, but it didn’t hurt us.” 
“[In 1974], we were very skeptical about the peace brought by Haby-arimana, but [later] we gained confidence in the politics of Habyarimana.” 
“In 1963, a lot of Tutsi were killed and houses burned, but afterwards calm returned. In 1973 as well after the take-over of power by Haby-arimana, the feeling of 
security increased. There was no problem.”
“In Rwanda [at that time], there were ethnic divisions. One ethnic group was favoured.”
“[…] Tutsi were not considered in the same way as Hutu, so they didn’t have all the advantages of Hutu.” 
“They didn’t want Tutsi to have secondary and higher education in order to prevent Tutsi  from having access to power.”
“At that time there were people with ‘genocidal ideas’, but they couldn’t put them into practice because the government didn’t want it at that time.”
“They [Hutu] had chased us from our country”. [Old caseload returnee]
 
The feeling of security starkly declines from 1990 onwards, 
after the RPF attacked Rwanda. Especially Tutsi living inside Rwanda, 
currently genocide survivors, gradually lost confidence in their fellow 
Hutu community members. Some areas were directly affected by the 
war  and  the  overall  war  culture  pervasive  throughout  the  country 
went together with the introduction of a multiparty system. The ex-
isting framework of clearly defined rules of conduct, social norms and 
power privileges evaporated. Initially this resulted in the experience 
of a multi-polar landscape with threats to the socio-political order 
coming from different sides: the Northerners (abakiga) against people 
from the south (Nduga); members of different political parties against 
each other; the RPF versus the Habyarimana regime. Political parties 
(amashyaka) used violent practices to recruit new members by ‘liber-
ating’ them from the ties with other parties (kubohoza). They erected 
youth wings that later converted into militia gangs to compete with 
each  other  and  terrorize  local  authorities.  Existing  (MRND)  power 
structures were contested and administrative authorities were some-
times ousted in their communities. This resulted in the breakdown of 
the existing authority structure that guaranteed territorial security. IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 2 Living the Transition
 Tutsi
“The authorities couldn’t solve my problems anymore, because of the political 
parties controlling the situation and looking to recruit members. They didn’t 
want Tutsi.”
“The effects of multipartyism were negative in the sense that one was harassed 
because being member of this or that political party.”
“There was tremendous upheaval.”
“There were a lot of parties here. We enrolled in the MRND, the strongest party 
here [in the village]. But it didn’t serve us well later on [in 1994].”
“There was no security because of the political parties and because of them we 
had the genocide.”
“With the arrival of the political parties, the situation was terrible. Before every-
one was member of the MRND, but then we had the MDR, CDR, PL, PSD.”
Hutu
“The authorities couldn’t solve the people’s problems anymore because of 
the war.” 
“The war had started, the political parties were fighting over members and 
the RPF could profit from this. We were afraid from the Northern Hutu.” 
“We couldn’t go to Kigali anymore, they called us Akazu, people on the side 
of the government in power.” 
“The youth members of the MDR had prevented me of governing the people 
of my cell (neighbourhood).”
“Authorities didn’t exist anymore, bandits dictated the law.” 
“We couldn’t sleep anymore, there was no free circulation allowed due to 
the violence caused by partisans of political parties such as the MRND, the 
MDR and the CDR.”
  Table 2  Habyarimana Regime (1973-1990) - Regime Attributes
Ideology • Ethnic, based on the (Hutu) 1959 revolution; majority (Hutu) rule as democratic rule
• Developmental > political – Developmental Dictatorship
• Peasantry / Manual Labour
Procedures • Single-party system; elections within the MRND
• Personality-based; strong presidency
• Party-state: state structures=MRND structures; centralised hierarchic structure.
• Ethnic quotas
Behaviour • Concentration of political power and wealth by an oligarchy; 
• Ethno-regional favouritism
• Clientelism; vigilance and strict control
 Regime Type Authoritarian regime, typical of post-colonial Africa: practiced strict control over the population; ruled by command; 
unrestrained presidential power; rulers were unaccountable to the population
Source: Compiled by author based on Rafti (2007)
  Table 3  The Political Transition (1990-1994) -  Regime/Transition Attributes
Ideology ·  Tri-polarity (1990-1993): Different currents; Pro-democratisation 
·  Bi-polarity (1993-1994): Pro-Arusha (pro-RPF); Anti-Arusha/’Hutu power’
Procedures •  Multi-party, semi-presidential system
•  Extrication of MRND from state structures
•  Limited multi-party local elections
•  Re-structuring of the security services
•  Arusha negotiations
Behaviour •  Violence (war; political violence; formal and informal state repression) 
•  Political mobilisation
•  Negotiations
Facets of the 
Transition
Three modalities of transition at play, changing over time:  reform  (Habyarimana government) → compromise (coalition 
government, Arusha talks) → overthrow (through war). Ethnic bi-polarity – structural factor that affects the transition.
Source: Compiled by author based on Rafti (2007)
In an effort to restore its authority the Habyarimana regime appealled on ethnic sentiments 
and managed to align multiple cleavages dividing the socio-political landscape with the central cleavage 
of Rwandan society: the Hutu – Tutsi bi-polarity. Tutsi living inside Rwanda become more and more stig-
matized as ‘enemies from within’, ‘cockroaches’ (Inyenzi) and ‘accomplices’ (Ibyitso) of the RPF, the enemy 
on the outside of Rwanda and perceived as a Tutsi rebel force eager to undo the achievements of the 1959 
Hutu revolution. Allegedly suspected Tutsi accomplices were incarcerated and massacres were instigated 
in some areas. The years between 1990 and 1994 are characterized by this mindset of war that diminishes 
the feeling of security and social cohesion, also within the Hutu group. But distrust was especially growing 
between the ethnic groups.26 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
TUTSI
“Because of the attack of the RPF, there was no security for Tutsi” 
“I was afraid, because the Hutu said I was a member of the RPF.” 
“Those in power were sensitizing the Hutu to kill the Tutsi”
“We were harassed ever since the RPF attacked Rwanda.
Tutsi were killed in Kibilira, Murambi and Bugesera.”
“The authorities started discriminating according to ethnic identity.
They were preparing for genocide.”
“I was not represented because searched after to be killed as an
accomplice (Ibyitso) of the RPF.”
“There was no security in the country and especially for Tutsi.”
“Confidence in Hutu diminished, because they imprisoned my father as an 
accomplice of the RPF.”
HUTU
“[There was no confidence in Tutsi], because they were of the same ethnicity as 
those who caused the war.” 
“The rumors of war made us lose confidence in them [Tutsi]” 
“Tutsi were shedding the blood of Hutu.” 
“They [Tutsi] were killing Hutu on the battlefield.” 
 “We pitied Tutsi because they were menaced and killed, but we also heard on 
the radio the atrocities committed by the soldiers of the RPF.” 
“People started to dissociate, Hutu said Tutsi had brought them war, Tutsi said 
Hutu were going to kill them.” 
“The war had started in Umutara [Northern region] and people could change 
and become ‘savage beasts’  (Inyamwaswa)”  
“I was afraid at that time, because on the radio they said the Inkotanyi [RPF] 
killed people.” 
Genocide in Context:  The Tale of Two Villages
Rukoma is a difficult to reach village in the south-east 
of Rwanda surrounded by swampland. After the ‘Hutu-revolution’ of 
1959 Tutsi living in other areas of Rwanda were deported to the area 
known for its difficult living terrain. They were installed on a sort of col-
lective farm, constructed by the state. Only a few Hutu families lived in 
the village. The downing of Habyarimana’s plane created panic in Ru-
koma. Hutu and Tutsi families gathered together on the central square. 
An attack came from another village nearby. United Hutu and Tutsi 
repelled the assailants. After three days, a member of parliament orig-
inating from the area together with a protestant pastor with connec-
tions to the highest government circles, came to explain that the ‘war 
was ethnic’. Hutu had to separate from Tutsi or they would be killed as 
well. Most followed these orders. The Tutsi, still grouped together in 
public places as schools and churches were attacked with traditional 
weapons such as machetes and spears. Their Hutu neighbors that had 
originally defended them looked on or started to join the attackers. 
They were ‘sensitized’. The word was spread that the Tutsi had killed 
the president. Others refused to distinguish themselves from the Tutsi. 
The Tutsi resisted strongly with the same traditional weaponry. But 
the village was known for the great number of Tutsi living there. This 
attracted attackers from the surrounding areas. A large group of Hutu 
refugees from Burundi came to kill, pillage and rape. They incited and 
coerced others to do the same. They lived in a refugee camp nearby 
and had fled Burundi in 1993 after the killing of the firstly elected 
Hutu president and the violence following thereupon. Groups of Inte-
rahamwe militia men also arrived, together with soldiers. Busses and 
jeeps transported them to the area. They brought modern weapons 
with them and it broke the Tutsi resistance. On the surrounding lake 
a boat transported groups of attackers every morning to the village to 
pillage and kill. In the evening, the assailants would return home to 
rest and return in the morning. An opportunity for the persecuted Tutsi 
to leave their shelter and seek food in the nightly abandoned fields. In 
the span of less than one month, 12758 of the Tutsi inhabitants were 
killed. On the 5th of May, the RPF arrived in the area and stopped the 
genocide against the Tutsi. The Burundians returned to Burundi and 
the armed forces had already withdrawn when the RPF arrived in the 
area. All of the Hutu villagers fled, either into the swamps as the Tutsi 
had done before or to neighboring countries. The RPF soldiers tolerat-IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 27 Living the Transition
ed and sometimes supervised large-scale revenge killings against the 
Hutu population. Originally, the village had 14984 inhabitants with 
90 % of the population being Tutsi. Currently Rukoma has a popula-
tion of 2373. In total, 538 Tutsi survived the genocide, 292 of them are 
still living in Rukoma.
The dynamics in the village called Ntabona were very dif-
ferent. After Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, every-
thing remained calm in Ntabona. After four days, and similarly as in Ru-
koma, the sector was attacked from a nearby village by Hutu refugees, 
displaced by the ongoing war with the RPF in the North. They wanted 
to harass the Tutsi population of Ntabona. The local bourgemestre, to-
gether with the population, was alerted and drove the attackers back, 
killing some in the process. Calm then returned to Ntabona but later 
a small group of ‘ideologists’, with a former FAR-soldier and trained 
Interahamwe taking the lead, began to terrorize the community. Their 
initial actions were framed in the language of the genocide and the tar-
get of their harassment was the Tutsi population as tokens of a larger 
abstract entity: “the Tutsi as the enemy”. But it was only after two 
weeks that they stepped up their actions and started to kill Tutsi. They 
could do so, since in the meantime, the political constellation in the 
community had changed: the bourgemestre, initially against the killing 
campaign, had lost his power through an intervention by the national 
authorities. The Interahamwe leader took over control of the village in 
this power-vacuum. He formed attacking groups (Igitero) composed of 
ordinary peasants to hunt down and kill Tutsi. The general perception 
of the population – both Hutu and Tutsi - was that these people us-
ing violence were ‘a group of bandits’ wanting to steal and take over 
power in the community. After some time this became clear when a 
large number of Hutu heads of household also figured on the death list 
of next ‘targets’. These Hutu were somehow connected through family 
ties, they were ‘the rich’ of the area, occupied positions of authority or 
had other forms of off-farm income. Their behaviour could be inter-
preted as ambiguous, occupied with their own safety and coming into 
action by killing the Interahamwe leader only when they themselves 
became the objects of violence. After this, calm returned to the sector 
until another Interahamwe leader, backed up by national authorities, 
and the ‘natural’ order of power-relations shifted again. The group ini-
tially pillaging and hunting down Tutsi found renewed courage in the 
words of the national authorities that urged the population to divide 
the parcels of the Tutsi. This economic incentive increased the partici-
pation in the attacks significantly. And some people were implicated 
for very personal reasons such as, for example, the teacher attacking 
the Tutsi family that had refused their daughter to marry him years be-
fore. In Ntabona, the genocide was not a straightforward event, rather 
periods of resistance alternated with periods of outright violence and 
both Tutsi and Hutu became the objects of violence. On the 4th of July, 
the RPF took over the region. Almost none of the Hutu inhabitants fled 
the village, there were no revenge killings, but massive incarcerations 
followed.2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
Graph 5   Subjective Ranking Perception of Economic Situation - Rukoma
Graph 6   Subjective Ranking Feeling of Security - Rukoma
Graph 7   Subjective Ranking  Perceived Level of Confidence - Rukoma
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Graph 9   Subjective Ranking Perception of Economic Situation - Ntabona
Graph 10   Subjective Ranking Feeling of Security - Ntabona
Graph 11   Subjective Ranking  Perceived Level of Confidence - Ntabona
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36	I	elaborated	this	theme	in:	B.	Ingelaere,	‘Chang-
ing  Lenses  and  Contextualizing  the  Rwandan  Post-
Genocide’	in:	F.	Reyntjens	&	S.	Marysse,	L’Afrique 














The downing of the plane of Habyarimana on 6th April 
1994 started the genocide and widespread violence throughout the 
country. Both Hutu and Tutsi reach the lowest point in their feeling 
of security according to their current ranking exercise. The regime in 
place at that time is considered to have incited Hutu to kill all Tutsi. 
Throughout this entire period of political transition, war, genocide and 
regime change, the degree of confidence Tutsi experienced for mem-
bers of their own ethnic group remained consistent and high in their 
current recollection. On the other hand: the nature of Hutu in-group 
starkly declines, especially during the genocidal campaign. While the 
intention of killing all Tutsi clearly stands out as the master narrative 
of the period between April and July 1994, a closer look at the varia-
tion in the periphery, the micro-administration of the genocide, also 
reveals the violence targeting people from all groups and for various 
reasons.36
TUTSI
“We were not human beings anymore because chased as if we were animals.”
“The government condamned us to death.”
“People died as flies.”
“Chasing Tutsi was authorized by the government and they asked all Hutu to kill 
Tutsi.”
“We were at the mercy of all fanatical Hutu.”
“In the fight against death, all Tutsi were united.”
“People  were  killed,  Hutu  and  Tutsi,  because  even  wealthy  Hutu  have  been 
killed.”
HUTU
“It were the authorities who gave orders to kill the others [Tutsi].”
“The state handed them [Tutsi] over (Leta Yabatanza)”37
“There was total anarchy during the genocide.”
“We were governed by groups of killers.”
“I was also afraid of being killed by the Hutu.”
“People participated because of Inda Nini [greed]”.
“Hutu also threatened me because I was hiding Tutsi.”
“It was war [ntambara] and I was afraid.”38
“I could have died at any moment then, because the war [ntambara] was
lethal.”
When  looking  back,  Tutsi  survivors  remember  they  re-
gained an acceptable level of physical security after the take over of 
power by the RPF. In contrast to the experience of Hutu in the imme-
diate aftermath, something that is sometimes acknowledged by Tutsi 
genocide survivors
TUTSI
“Security was assured. There were always soldiers [of the RPA] nearby.”
“Soldiers were everywhere and in our turn we traced the criminals [Hutu].”
“My husband was sought by soldiers of the RPF who wanted to arrest all male 
Hutu.”
HUTU
“It was a manhunt of the soldiers of the Inkotanyi [the RPF], killing Hutu.”
“During the genocide, Hutu chased Tutsi and after the take-over of power by 
the RPF, Tutsi chased Hutu.”
“We went to Congo and it was possible to be killed going there and in Congo 
where people died as flies.”
The ranking for perceived political representation by Tutsi 
is remarkably high immediately after the take over of power, especially 
in contrast to the ranking of Hutu. This is due to the fact that the new 
regime was, by both groups, perceived as being “Tutsi” (-dominated). 
The political order had changed completely due to the military over-
throw. The rankings reveal an ethnic reversal of the power constella-
tion, at least in the popular experience.
TUTSI
“The government was on our side and we had a feeling of superiority towards 
the Hutu.”
“The Tutsi were satisfied with this new regime.”
“The war was over, there were still tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, but the 
government was on the side of the Tutsi.”
HUTU
“In 1995, there were authorities, but I was not represented.”
“They incarcerated several innocent persons and others were killed.
So authorities made a distinction in the way they governed.”IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 1 Living the Transition
  Table 4  The Provisional (94-03) & Consolidated Post-Genocide  
    Regime (03-07) – Regime Attributes39 
Ideology •  Liberation from colonial mindset;
•  ‘Rwandanicity’ / Citizenship – Abolishing Ethnicity
•  Unity and Reconciliation; Fighting genocide (Accountability)
•  Development; Vision 2020
Procedures •  Multi-party (without grassroots political activity), electoral ‘semi-presidential’ system;  
•  ‘Consensus-based’ democracy; ‘home-grown’ national strategies
•  Bi-cameral national assembly (with appointed and elected members); 
•  1994-2003 Commissions endorsed
Behaviour •  Strong executive; 
•  Military might; Strong Army (RDF); 
•  Clamp-down on civil and political rights
•  Constriction of discourse and policy-making by small RPF group
•  Commissions act as RPF ideological vectors and disciplinary organs
•  Rule by command and force
Regime Type Electoral authoritarian: democratic procedures but  non-democratic exercise of power; uneven political  
‘playing field’; restriction on political and civil rights; limited accountability
Source: Compiled by author based on Rafti (2007)
This ethnically diverging perception of the nature of politi-
cal representation continues until now although Hutu steadily evolved 
from a negative appreciation into a positive one. This is mostly due to 
the fact that violent practices such as revenge killings, brutal pacifica-
tion campaigns and massive (often) arbitrary arrests lasted for several 
years, but gradually ceased in the course of time. The year 2000 con-
stitutes a turning point. In the years following the genocide, Hutu who 
fled to Congo, firstly experienced the violent dismantling of the camps 
in Congo, followed by massive arrests, extrajudicial and revenge kill-
ings inside Rwanda and a bald counter-insurgency strategy by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army to repel the infiltrators (Abacengezi) that at-
tacked Rwanda in 1996. The Abacengezi, members of the defeated 
army (FAR) and Interahamwe-militia, infiltrated (especially Northern) 
Rwanda and attacked Tutsi survivors and old-caseload returnees, but 
also Hutu who had taken up a position in the new regime. They lived 
among the ordinary Hutu peasants, who, therefore, were often also 
targeted as infiltrators by the new regime. Hutu, therefore, felt inse-
cure for several years without signs of a steady recovery. In the same 
period,  approximately  130.000  Hutu  were  incarcerated.  Waves  of 
prisoners are released from 2003 onwards. Until that moment they 
live in the harsh circumstances of overcrowded prisons with, in their 
recollection, the lowest level of security possible.
Although the new regime “was on their side” and guar-
anteed physical security for the genocide survivors, their perceived 
recovery in the following years went slow. The loss of house, goods 
and family members, trauma and the destruction of the social fabric 
impeded recovery for several years. The genocide and war and their 
violent aftermath, had left local communities not only economically 
devastated, but deeply divided along ethnic lines. The degree of con-
39	We	argue	that	the	officially	proclaimed	period	
of	transition	between	1994	and	2003	did	not	entail	
regime	 transition.	 Regime	 transition	 implies	 a	
fundamental	change	in	ideology,	procedures	and	
behaviour.	 The	 post	 1994	 period	 brought	 about	
the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 regime	 that	 came	 in	
place	with	the	military	overtrow	in	July	1994.	No	
fundamental	change	occurred	in	the	ideological,	
procedural	 and	 behavioural	 attributes	 of	 that	
regime	in	the	period	1994-2007.		See:	M.	Rafti,	op.	
cit.2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
fidence in the other ethnic group dropped dramatically, especially in 
the recollection of Tutsi respondents. Also old-case load returnees re-
turning to Rwanda in the wake of the take-over of power, settled in a 
threatening environment in their eyes
TUTSI
“Those who were not killed due to the war, have been seriously harmed by it (uwo 
itishe yaramukomerekeje).” 
“It was as if we were dead (gupfa uhagaze)”
“[In the years following the genocide], I regarded every Hutu as a killer” 
“I was afraid from the Hutu, they glanced at me with an evil eye (kureba umuntu 
n’ijisho ribi).” 
“Interahamwe were still hiding in the forests.” 
“Hutu were throwing stones on our houses at night.”
“Trust in Hutu completely disappeared when I saw what they had done
during the genocide.” [Old Caseload Returnee]
HUTU
“I was in the middle as the tongue (Narindi hagati nk’ururimi.)40. When you 
were for Kagame, the infiltrators would kill you, when you were for the
infiltrators, the RPA would kill you”
“During the war of the infiltrators, we could become the target of the
soldiers of the RPF or of the infiltrators.” 
“In the years between 94 and 2000 a lot of inhabitants had been killed by 
soldiers considering us to be Abacengezi (infiltrators).” 
“I was imprisoned and we were not sure at all of being alive the next
morning, soldiers carried off people and went to kill them.”
 
		3.3.3	2000-2005
At the end of the 90s a normalization of social life takes 
place, but along the lines that were set out at the initial take-over of 
power. The feeling of security increases for both Hutu and Tutsi, at least 
the security of body and belongings (umutekano w’umubir n’uw’ibintu), 
not so much the food security, the security of the stomach (umutekano 
muke  w’inda).  Ordinary  life  recommenced,  especially  because  overt 
hostilities on Rwandan soil ceased. The consequences of the 1994 car-
nage and the threat of persecution by Hutu infiltrators diminished for 
Tutsi, while the terror and violent practices of the new regime target-
ing Hutu equally decreased. Also the situation in the prisons improved. 
Only minor progress was made concerning the livelihood situation in 
the countryside, as the ranking exercise makes clear. This caused the 
experience of the “insecurity of the stomach”. The dire economic situ-
ation becomes even worse during periods of drought and food short-
age, as for example in 2000. Although this is the case for both groups, 
it is often more pronounced for genocide survivors since they lost fam-
ily and assets, elements to rely on during periods of hardship.
TUTSI
“Operations to kill people diminished.”
“Time went by and the sentiment to stay alive intensified.”
“War is not only bullets, even bad living conditions can be worse than war.” 
“The war was over, but the war that stayed was the war against hunger.” 
“In the year 2000, there was scarcity and we suffered from an empty stomach.”
HUTU
“We started to forget the difficult moments we had in 1997-1999.” 
“Years went by and we were not afraid anymore for vengeance from the 
Tutsi.” 
“Certain errors were corrected, like for example the arbitrary arrests.” 
“We started cultivating our plots of land and were sure we would not be vio-
lently mistreated (guhohoterwa) by anyone” 
The government made reconciliation a policy objective 
only after the year 2000. This was reflected in the numerous sensiti-
zation campaigns (Ibikorwa byo gukangurira) continuously held in rural 
areas. The ethnic groups, who initially had shared the same living envi-
ronment on the Rwandan hills, lived together, not reconciled (abiyunze), 
but in a mode of non-violent co-existence (kubana). 
TUTSI
“The administrators convinced us to live together, even with the Hutu.”
“Hutu didn’t look at us anymore with an evil eye.”
HUTU
“There were a lot of sensitization meetings and gradually we became convinced.” 
“The ethnic tensions diminished and the survivors soothed their tempers.”
40	The	expression	refers	to	the	fact	that	danger	
came	from	two	sides.	The	tongue	is	caught	in	the	
middle	between	two	rows	of	teeth.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
Although the degree of trust in the other ethnic group in-
creased during this period, the difference between the nature of confi-
dence in the own and the other group remained high, as can be seen on 
the results of the ladder of life ranking.
TUTSI
“I will never be able to really trust Hutu, if they have the opportunity, 
they can still kill me.” 
HUTU
“The Hutu cannot totally trust Tutsi.”
This ethnic distrust is subtly reflected in daily life on the 
linguistic level in statements such as on the one hand hagati yacu or 
turi twenyine (between us – our ethnic group) and on the other hand 
hagati yabo or ari bonyine (between them – their ethnic group). Moreo-
ver, on the geographical level Hutu and Tutsi only live to a minor ex-
tent as neighbours in their respective communities. Tutsi survivors 
mostly live grouped together in settlements (imidugudu) erected after 
the  genocide  in  their  original  neighbourhood.  Those  who  returned 
from foreign countries – the so-called ‘old caseload returnees’ - set-
tled mostly in cities or have otherwise taken houses in the settlements 
with the other Tutsi, genocide survivors. This has an effect on the flux 
of  social  interactions  that  are  most  sought-after  and  qualitatively 
intense with the people sharing the same living environment by fre-
quenting nearby bars, shops and houses. But the predominant and 
most intense interactions with members of the own ethnic group and 
its consequences on the linguistic level is only to a secondary extent 
a result from a spatial restructuring of hillside life after the genocide. 
The massive decrease in mutual trust towards members of the other 
ethnic group is the primary source of the inequality in social interac-
tions between ethnic groups. Both groups state that by the end of the 
90s and in contrast with the preceding years the government started 
preventing that widespread ethnic distrust would translate into overt 
forms of violence.
TUTSI
“They are afraid to aggress us because of the government keeping a watchful 
eye on us.”
“I am never going to visit Hutu and they never come to me, I can’t even ask 
them drinking water.” 
“We need to distance ourselves from the Hutu, because they can use poison 
to hurt us. Among the survivors on the other hand, we share everything, 
even our grief.”
 HUTU
“When we see our victims [genocide survivors], we think they might seek revenge, 
but thanks to authorities they don’t.” 
“[The] Authority is good, because the victims of the genocide and their ‘bullies’ 
(abishi) live together, they are not chasing each other anymore.”
“The Tutsi government has done a lot to unite Rwandans.”
In popular perceptions, power and identity remain inter-
twined, as they have always been in Rwandan history, and also after 
2000 they stayed configured along the parameters set out during the 
initial take-over of power, even when government policies are appreci-
ated. The strained relationship between ethnicity and the hold on or 
access to power is illustrated in recollections of the 2003 presidential 
elections. Tutsi often refer to the fact that they were free to choose 
their representatives, while this narrative thread is almost completely 
lacking for Hutu. Although a significant number of Hutu will have de- • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
liberately chosen for the representative in line with the ‘order of things’, 
it is clear that Hutu were guided in the making of their choice, some-
times through subtle means, but guidance also came through overt 
coercion. 
TUTSI
 “We elected the authorities of our choice.”
“During the elections, you could remark sort of ruptures based on ethnic 
factions”
“A great number of people here didn’t want the president [Kagame], so 
a lot of security forces came for ‘that’.”
“I saw Hutu didn’t really like us, they said they didn’t want a Tutsi as 
president. But we ‘arranged’ ourselves and got our candidate [Kagame] 
elected.”
“We voted for our president because the reason why we are still alive is 
thanks to him.”
“Since president Kagame took power, we are very well represented.  But 
it will be necessary to be very attentive during the next elections [to 
keep it that way.
HUTU
“People thought the war would restart.”
“[In the year of the elections] there was the fear of a possible war: if Kagame was not 
elected there could be reprisals, if he was elected there could be troubles caused by 
the Hutu.”
“We were afraid the elections would not go as the government had planned and that 
we would have problems.”
“Soldiers were everywhere and a Tutsi could lie to them about your voting intentions 
so you would end up in prison and tortured.”
“They made us vote by force and we were afraid for reprisals if the elections didn’t go 
as they had planned.” 
“In the voting booth, we were accompanied by someone else indicating where to 
place the thumb, no refusal possible, otherwise ….
The outcome of the elections was a guarantee of physical 
security for Tutsi: their expectations for political representation in the 
future are conditioned on a status-quo of the current order of things. 
Hutu were also relieved and moved up in their ranking of political rep-
resentation, but more because the simmering tensions in the build-up 
to the elections did not erupt into violence. Others phrase their experi-
ence in more neutral terms, but also appreciate the stability brought 
by the ‘new’ elected government considering the upheaval of the past. 
The practices of the administration are in general appraised in the years 
following the elections. The gradual release of prisoners contributed 
to this more positive appraisal on the part of the Hutu population. Al-
though this policy created frustration and fear for genocide survivors.
TUTSI
“The Hutu didn’t cause problems after the election of president Kagame, they 
only said the votes were stolen.”
“I am very well represented, because if the Hutu are afraid of me it is because of 
the government.”
“Without the authorities we would still be massacred by the Hutu.”
:“[I will feel represented] if president Kagame stays in power.” 
“[I will feel represented] on the condition that ‘power’ doesn’t change.”
“Since the end of the genocide we have good representatives listening to the 
problems of the population.”
“Currently there are Tutsi in power. It was not them that killed us and can re-
start.”
HUTU
“Calm returned and we regained confidence [in Tutsi].”
“I was happy to have a president.” 
“With the reign of Kagame, it’s better with our representation.”
“The king does not kill, it’s the people that kill. (Umwami ntiyica, hica
rubanda)41” 
“The authorities started addressing the problems of the population.” 
“The elected administrators governed us well [in that period].”
“President Kagame had liberated some persons.” 
“The head of state calms the survivors, otherwise all of us would be inside 
the prisons.”
“Since 2000, I started cultivating, I could go to the market and local au-
thorities could solve my problems
3.3.4		2005	onwards
Stability and physical security, being able to cultivate the 
fields, to sleep and eat is highly appreciated and stands in stark con-
trast with the turmoil of the 90s. Progress is made through policies 
that need to improve the well-being of the population. But there is a 
general perception that policies are not based on the needs and will of 
the population and even run counter to possible improvement, espe-
cially related to the economic situation. The nature and functioning of 
the local governance structure, institutionally consolidated during the 
administrative restructuring in the beginning of 2006, contributes to 
these grievances. 
41	 Expression	 referring	 to	 pre-colonial	 Rwanda	
and	indicating	that	Rwandans	are	in	general	of	
the	 opinion	 that	 bad	 things	 and	 practices	 are	
not	due	to	the	ruling	of	the	highest	‘chefs’	(king	
or	 president),	 but	 because	 of	 lower	 ‘chefs’	 and	
people	in	the	entourage	of	the	ruler.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
At the lowest level, sector and cell, a balance between ‘ap-
pointed’ and ‘elected’ authorities has been instituted. [See figure 3]
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The importance given and the power attached to these 
different posts in the local governance structure by the central admin-
istration is in the first place reflected in the balance between ‘elect-
ed’ and ‘appointed’ positions. Moreover, only persons occupying the 
‘appointed’ positions receive a regular salary by the central/district 
administration, a privilege reflecting the importance attached to the 
post. The secretary-executive is the most powerful person in the sec-
tor. He or she is not elected, but appointed by central authorities in 
Kigali and mostly comes from outside the sector. He is flanked by a 
consultation committee of elected sector residents (niyanama), but 
this body mostly functions as an approval machine for decisions taken 
higher up, policies the executive-secretary needs to implement. Survey 
results42 indicate that over the past years the level of popular partici-
pation has increased (Table 5 – Q. 1-4), but the quality of participation 
has decreased (Q. 5-8). The balance between appointed and elected 
positions and the direction of accountability contributes to this dispar-
ity. While government policies are appreciated in general (Q. 9) or re-
lated to particular elements (Q. 12-13), the upcoming land reform cre-
ates anxiety within the population (Q. 11), while the feeling of poverty 
steadily increases (Q. 14).  Development is increasingly done by force. 
Improving the wellbeing of the population is – paradoxically – (partly) 
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1 % of respondents with the impression that they take part in the decision 
making on problems related to them
85 88 93
2 % of respondents that has recently participated in the activities of a local 
voluntary association
34 34 37
3 % of local elected personnel that at least once a month participates in reunions 
or activities to  execute their task 
58 60 63
4 % of beneficiaries participating in the administration of service delivery related 
to health, education or water 
2 1 6
5 % of respondents of the opinion that the use of force is the motor of 
participation in state activities
41 47 52
6 % of respondents of the opinion it is better to leave the administration of local 
affairs to the central government
56 59 64
7 % of respondents of the opinion that only the sector coordinator (secretary-
executive) really knows what to do and not the members of the executive 
committees
30 26 35
8 % of locally elected personnel that considers the proper engagement as elected 
person limited
18 17 30
9 % of respondents recognizing the efforts made by the government to improve 
the living conditions of Rwandans
89 96 98
10 % of respondents accepting the fight by the government to fight against the 
“ethnic divisionism” by limiting the right to associate 
91 84 90
11 % of respondents in favour of the proposition by the government to consolidate 
land in order to reduce poverty
64 56 58
12 % of respondents of the opinion that governance and the fight against 
corruption improved in the districts
82 70 78
13 % of respondents of the opinion that governance and the fight against 
corruption improved in the sectors
85 85 89
14 % of respondents that declares him/herself very poor (on the bottom two steps 
of a “ladder of life” with seven steps)
54 55 59
Source: Republic of Rwanda, Cohesion Sociale 2005-2006. Sondage d’Opinion, (Kigali: National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission – NURC, 2007) (Unpublished – On File With the Author)
The fact that the local government has a certain vision 
and dedication to the ‘development’ of the area is appreciated. They 
also have a ‘technical capacity’ and ideas to do so, because of their 
education.43 But local authorities show a ‘zeal’ in the implementation 
of these objectives in the locality they ‘govern’ and so surpassing the 
capacities of the ‘governed’. They have a great autonomy in achieving 
these goals and in the overall interpretation of national government 
policies. Moreover, the chain of accountability goes upwards towards 
higher authorities and not downwards towards the population; they 
are appointed, not elected.44 Subsequently, an ambitious and inter-
nally coherent national ideology and vision is translated to the local 
level where measures are taken by coercion irrespective of ‘real-world’ 
considerations and local authorities often demand a lot of investments 
of the population, often enforced through a system of fines (see Table 
6). They need to stick to so-called performance contracts signed with 
authorities higher up. These contracts are referred to as Imihigo, and 
refer to the capability to show others and observers that one is capa-
ble and competent in the execution of a task.45 Social engineering has 
become the modus operandi in state-society relations and underlies a 
43	 Personal	 capacity	 or	 power	 [ububasha]	 to	
achieve	something	in	life	is	often	phrased	in	terms	
of	 having	 ‘ideas’.	 Lack	 of	 ideas	 and	 intellectual	
capacity	implies	the	incapacity	to	move	up	in	life.	
44	In	several	locations	local	authorities	have	been	








ants.	See:	The New Times,	‘Performance contracts 
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wide range of policy initiatives and practices. The narratives reflecting 
a sense of voicelessness and powerlessness indicate that these state 
interventions are not rooted in the local realities. This is also the case 
for Tutsi, genocide survivors but to a minor extent since in general the 
presence of a political order that guarantees physical safety prevails 
for them over the shortcomings of actual policy initiatives.
Table 6  System Of Fines Used for the Implementation of Measures Im-
proving General Wellbeing
Forbidden	or	Obligatory	Activity FINE	(RWF)
1 - Tending livestock on ‘public places’      10.000
2 - Cultivating on riverbeds      10.000
3 - Refusal to dig anti-erosion canals      10.000
4 - Absence of roof-gutter and receptacle near house  10.000
5 - ‘Having’ a second wife      10.000
6 - Churches without chapel (building)      10.000
7 - Religious groups praying at night      10.000
8 - Refusal to participate in nocturnal security patrols            10.000
9 - Parents who refuse to send children to school    10.000
10 - Teacher or other person sending child from school for not paying tuition fee  10.000
11 - Consulting traditional ‘healer’ without authorization  10.000
12 - Cutting trees without permission      10.000
13 - Heating wood to fabricate charcoal      10.000
14 - Selling wood products without authorization    10.000
15 - Refusal to make/use a ‘modern cooking stove’    10.000
16 - Selling  home-made products like cheese, milk, etc, without authorization 10.000
17 - House without compost bin      2.000
18 - House without clothesline      2.000
19 - House without closed toilet      2.000
20 - House without table to put cooking utensils    2.000
21 - House without conservation place for drinking water  2.000
22 - Someone without clean clothing & body hygiene  2.000
23 - Teacher without clean clothing & body hygiene    10.000
24 - Consumption of beers in cabarets or at home with straw  10.000
25 - Commercial centre without toilet      10.000
26 - Restaurant without toilets or not clean      10.000
27 - School compound not clean      10.000
28 - Health centre without hygiene      10.000




“We thought the state was going to help the survivors, but until now, I haven’t 
seen any help.”
“I wish the authorities would listen to the interests of the population. The State 
should do all that is possible to save the people that risk to die from poverty.”
“Since the liberation of prisoners, the authorities don’t want to listen and follow 
up on my anxiety caused by these liberated prisoners.”
HUTU
“They [political dignitaries] seek a solution for the problems of the popula-
tion, but they don’t want to know what our real problems are. If the state is 
not engaging in listening to the problems of the population, poverty will kill 
people in the shortest delay.” 
“They [national authorities] are there [in Kigali], but they don’t want to come 
into the countryside although it is there where there are a lot of problems.” 
“They come to make us have reunions, but they ignore completely our well-
being.” 
“I can’t say we feel represented, people are dying from hunger and nobody 
is taking stock.”  • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
The identity of power holders in these key positions at the 
local level and the (perceived) nature of the exercise of power tend to 
give an ethnic dimension to grievances. These statements shed light on 
the perceived order of things and explain the gap between subjective 
rankings over time according to the identity of the respondent: Hutu 
or Tutsi. Although state institutions and stated policies are intended 
to overcome (ethnic) divisions, at least in the ordinary perception they 
also perpetuate the cleavages they are supposedly eradicating. 
HUTU
“They [Tutsi] have all of power and power is on their side. Even when a Tutsi does wrong, one cannot punish because authorities don’t want to ‘touch themselves 
in the stomach’ (Kwikora mu nda)46.” 
“Currently, we have no liberty of expression, what is said is controlled, there are things we do not dare to say out of fear of being thrown in prison.” 
“Representation is only for some people, the Tutsi, not for the Hutu, we have no right to speak.” 
“There are Hutu in the administration, but the problem is that when a Tutsi makes an error, he or she is not punished as a Hutu who made the same mistake.” 
“We Hutu are obliged to keep our cows fenced inside, while Tutsi are free to let them circulate outside.”
“[The representatives] take much trouble to help the survivors, but do nothing for the Hutu. It accentuates the differences between people. The Hutu do not dare 
to say this in public, but they envy the privileges allocated to the Tutsi.” 
“They [authorities] install divisions between people, I mean, the Hutu have nothing to say.” 
“The state needs to stop making distinctions between people, so that problems will vanish and confidence will return.” 
“We are not afraid of the genocide survivors, but we are afraid of the harm we inflicted upon them [during the genocide]. Today they are strong, they have the 
power.” 
 Within this framework of (perceived) state functioning, 
the Gacaca courts were installed to tackle the distrust between Hutu 
and Tutsi and reconcile Rwanda and Rwandans. From the year 2000 
onwards, the upward trend is visible on the charts depicting the re-
sults of the ranking exercise. But the levelling of this trend is equally 
visible from 2005 onwards, the moment when the Gacaca courts come 
to dominate rural life. The Gacaca process should bring reconciliation, 
but instead, or at least in its initial or operational phase does the place-
ment on the ladder of life by respondents indicate that the degree of 
trust in the other ethnic group is not improving with the advent of the 
Gacaca process. The feeling of security starkly diminishes for genocide 
survivors, but also for Hutu who were never imprisoned but stand now 
accused in their communities. Tutsi and especially genocide survivors 
feel less secure since the start of Gacaca, while the feeling of security 
levels out for Hutu. 
Both  Hutu  and  Tutsi  situate  themselves  several  steps 
lower on the ladder of life compared to the situation before the geno-
cide and war, the start of the political transition. Most of this is a con-
sequence of the violence: the dire economic situation in rural areas, 
the loss of life and goods, the destruction of the social fabric and social 
cohesion. The state guarantees physical security and local authorities 
are present to solve conflicts and problems for both Hutu and Tutsi. 
Both groups are faced with the problem of the security of the stom-
ach, the economic and household situation. Nevertheless, in general 
Hutu perceive their security situation lower compared to fellow Tutsi 
community members. This is a result from the fact that security also 
entails an appreciation of the political order, the policies it generates 
and how these policies are implemented. 
46	This	expression	means	that	one	doesn’t	want	
to	 sanction	 someone	 from	 one’s	 own	 family	 or	
group.	 The	 word	 stomach	 introduces	 the	 idea	
of	 pregnancy	 referring	 to	 the	 sharing	 of	 blood,	
coming	from	the	same	womb.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
In the aftermath of war and genocide, co-habitation was 
a necessity as mentioned above. Life in the countryside is highly prag-
matic. Peasants depend on each other in their daily struggle for sur-
vival in mutual impoverishment. Secrets are kept in the dark and per-
sonal thoughts are not ventilated in order not to make enemies in the 
community. But distrust was pervasive, lingering under the surface 
of daily life. Confidence and the feeling of security is often expressed 
by referring to the heart, as explained above. The heart is the force 
unifying the human being. Hearts have changed because of the crimes 
committed, the violence experienced and the inhuman acts observed. 
Reconciliation, therefore, is a matter of the heart (umutima). Hutu and 
Tutsi would share the same living area again and partake in ordinary 
village activities in a mode of peaceful co-existence. The heart was 
only tacitly explored in the years before the installation of the Gacaca 
courts, without much discursive content.
TUTSI
“Before [1994] people shared everything. Today, that’s finished. Before, a daugh-
ter was given for marriage without verifying the origins of the husband, while 
this has become a major concern currently.”
“The genocide has killed a lot of Tutsi in Rwanda and later, the Rwandan army 
has equally killed a lot of Hutu. So there is a problem of hatred in the heart of 
people from all categories [ethnicity].”
HUTU
“The heart of man is far  ” 
“One is confident in others when you can ‘read’ the heart of the other, but 
since that is impossible, it is equally difficult to be confident in people.” 
“The face one shows is different from that which is in the heart.” 
“It is difficult to know what is in the heart of the other, so I have to be care-
ful.”
Exploring the heart of the other would come into play af-
ter 2005, when the Gacaca courts started to operate nation-wide in 
every local community.  The (nature of) participation during the Gacaca 
sessions has become the element to probe (the nature of) the heart 
of the other. The (state-sanctioned) speaking or hearing of the truth 
has become an important condition to increase the level of confidence 
between parties that distrusted the nature of the heart of the other 
before. The truth is not only an important prerequisite in the restruc-
turing of social relationships, it is equally the cornerstone of the entire 
transitional justice framework in Rwanda47. The fact that truth in the 
popular experience, both from the side of Hutu and Tutsi, is perceived 
as not surfacing in the Gacaca process, explains the levelling out of 
the confidence ranking. Not only factual knowledge remains largely 
absent, but a re-humanization and re-socialization of the other—the 
healing dimension of truth-telling—is not easily forthcoming.
TUTSI
“Gacaca made relationships between people worse.”
“They [Hutu] confess only partially, they are not telling the entire truth.” 
“The Gacaca judges are not veracious, they are accomplices of the criminals.” 
“People are not telling the truth [here]. Survivors have become liars in front of 
their perpetrators and those who confess don’t do it from the depths of their 
heart.” 
“Our former neighbours don’t want to tell us how our family members were killed 
and who came to pillage our belongings.”
“For the Hutu, we greet each other in passing, but there is no real confidence. 
They think I will accuse them in Gacaca for what the other Hutu have done [in 
1994]”
HUTU
“To have confidence, you need to be sure people tell the truth, but they 
don’t.”
“The victims also need to tell the truth in their testimonies without lying 
because it ‘kills’ confidence.”
“I  have  no  problem  with  the  genocide  survivors,  but  the  fact  that  I  de-
nounced my neighbours as accomplices [in crimes during the genocide], has 
created conflicts.”
“A lot of Hutu started fleeing the country since the start of Gacaca. They are 
afraid of being accused.”
“The inhabitants [of the community] do not trust each other. They are not 
united, they are not telling the truth. It’s the result of the war. Before the 
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Despite Gacaca and partially because of Gacaca, Tutsi sur-
vivors continue to situate the nature of their confidence in Hutu on the 
negative side of the ladder of life. Tutsi old case load returnees are less 
pronounced in their disapproval of Hutu. They never evenly embodied 
the physical threats and psychological hardship the genocide survi-
vors firsthand experienced during the 1994 extermination campaign, 
but they have not forgotten the course of history. Hutu suffer more 
from an overall climate of distrust, especially due to the denunciation 
principle through which the Gacaca courts operate. They express a 
higher degree of confidence in Tutsi than Tutsi in Hutu, but this is still 
significantly less than the in-group cohesion they portray. Hutu dis-
trust towards Tutsi is for them often also more resulting from govern-
ment policies that ought to facilitate the reconciliation process, but at 
the same time obstruct their own objectives. Hutu situate themselves, 
on average, on the positive side of the ranking for political representa-
tion, the feeling of security and confidence in Tutsi, but the fact that 
they are situated lower than Tutsi respondents, should be interpreted 
in that way.
TUTSI
“Me, I can’t trust Hutu, they are angry [because accused in Gacaca], they are 
like animals.” 
“There are those who still cultivate hatred and others harbour the genocide ide-
ology.” 
“There is no confidence between people due to ethnicity.” 
“The government obliges us to live together with them, but we know it are very 
malicious people, they can still kill us.” 
“They can’t exterminate us massively, but they can kill us one by one.” 
“The Hutu dispelled us from Rwanda in 1959, they burned our homes, ate our 
cows and did it again in 1973, while in 1994 they have killed almost every sin-
gle Tutsi. How can I trust people who behave like animals?” [Old Caseload Re-
turnee]
“Nothing is possible to restore confidence in the population, even when you ‘boil 
an elephant in a jug’ (niyo wateka inzovu mu rwabya), it’s over.”48 
HUTU
“How can I be confident when I see that I am going to die in prison.” 
“Until now they call us Interahamwe, because we are Hutu.” 
“The state needs to stop favouring some and punishing others. As long as 
some feel superior compared to others, there will be no confidence.” 
“The obstacles for Rwandans are those trials that are unjust. One ought to 
leave the ordinary peasant who didn’t know what was going on [in 1994]. 
But they do it anyway because they are judging the Hutu (ethnic) group. Is 
there a Tutsi put on trial? They also killed, but you can’t accuse them. If 
someone stands upright in his State, you can’t do anything against him (Iyo 
umunu ahagaze muri Leta ye, nta kindi wakora)49.”
“They  [Tutsi  power  holders]  can  use  [make]  us  [Hutu]  as  their  servile 
instrument(s)” (Bashaka kutugira ibikoresho)50.” 
“The cry is not combatting the drum (Induru ntirwana n’ingoma)51.”
It should be noted that these statements reflect the domi-
nant perception, as depicted when considering the ethnically diverging 
rankings on the ladder of life. But the overall picture also reflects the 
fact that both Hutu and Tutsi situate themselves on the positive side 
of the ladder again, except for the economic situation. Therefore, nar-
ratives also indicate an appreciation of a positive evolution on these 
themes compared to the upheaval experienced in the past. 
TUTSI
“I noticed there are some Hutu who have very human sentiments, more than 
some Tutsi.” 
“Gacaca has done something for me. It is a sort of connecting-piece between the 
victims and perpetrators. There are people of all sorts. Those who tell the truth, 
others lie and even more just say nothing. But somehow people are together to 
talk.”
“I am confident in people. I pardoned them, but I am most confident in those who 
pray together with me. I (re)gained confidence in Hutu. I am often together with 
them in their ceremonies where I play an important role.”
 HUTU
 “The genocide survivors said [during Gacaca] that I did not play any role 
during the genocide. So, in a certain way, I regained confidence in them.”
“I started having good relationships with everyone, the year that my hus-
band was liberated from prison.”
“After my liberation, not one genocide survivor has treated my badly al-
though it was my expectation when still in prison. The programme of unity 
and reconciliation will continue and be fruitful.
48	Signifying:	even	when	you	do	the	impossible	
one	will	never	restore	confidence	in	the	population.	
An	 expression	 with	 an	 identical	 signification	
is	“niyo wateka ibuye rigashya”	–	when	you	cook	a	
stone	until	it	becomes	eatable.	
49	Signifying	that	one	cannot	do	anything	against	
a	 person	 who	 feels	 strong	 because	 very	 well	
represented	 by	 the	 government,	 it	 gives	 the	
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A trend most see continued in the future, but neverthe-
less often conditioned on (the absence of) a crucial element of inter-
ference that might derail the process. For example the condition that 
the nature of the (perceived) ethnic power balance does not change in 
the future in order to feel represented as already mentioned above for 
Tutsi, or, paradoxically, on the condition that Gacaca is over or, but to a 
lesser extent, Gacaca has reached its goal. 
TUTSI
“Maybe the children will live in harmony because the teaching of hatred that 
divided Rwandans is over, but the adults will die with their divisions.”
 “In order for people to be totally unified, Gacaca should continue because 
it will restore confidence.”
“If Gacaca is finished, I think Hutu will hate us less.”
“When Gacaca will be over, the situation will be good.”
“In the future, I think security will be good, but there are people on the out-
side [Hutu refugees], that might want to return and disturb our security.”
 HUTU
 “[After 2010] Gacaca will be finished and this will bring calm in the population. 
Tensions between people will diminish.”
“If Gacaca finishes and I am not put in prison again, confidence towards Tutsi 
will increase again.”
“[In the future] Gacaca will be over and we will see that it is not good to have 
conflicts and bad relationships.”
“I don’t think they will stop their ‘bad’ operations of killing and incarcerating 
people in the future.”
“If the imprisonments continue, this will cause insecurity, because a lot of peo-
ple are not satisfied. It can provoke another war.
The conditionality of the expectations towards the future 
reveals a high level of uncertainty based on a sense of fragility per-
meating virtually all domains of life. A fragility not only resulting from 
the violence experienced (past and present – overt and covert), but 
equally from an understanding of Rwandan history as excerpts from 
interviews, one from a Hutu, the other from a Tutsi genocide survivor, 
indicate. They shed light on the “underneath of the things”52, the un-
dercurrent of ethnicity gravitated towards the loopholes of power, at 
least in the perception of the ordinary peasant. 
TUTSI
“On the State, I have nothing to say. It is the State that organizes reconciliation 
without consulting us, without consulting the wise men. It is the State that does 
what it wants. The State decides what needs to be done. [...] The State says “you 
do this” and you clap your hands. […] [Referring to the genocide] People put into 
practice whatever you ask them to do (Abantu ni ba nyamujya iyo bigiye – men 
follow the current of things). […] We have a small pause of calm. There is peace 
but without guarantee. Habyarimana also said to bring us peace, but afterwards 
they killed our children. If you sleep at night and wake up in the morning, it’s 
good (ni ukubara ubukey). All changes always. Everything changes here on earth. 
The priest says things happen in eternal succession, so …. .  […] It [massacres] 
are things that happen often since 1959. The authorities tell us that there is 
peace. For example in 1973. But see what happened in 1994. How much time 
has passed since 1994 to confirm that it will never happen again?”
HUTU
“Why  are  you  asking  questions  about  powersharing  and  democracy?  In 
Rwandan tradition and custom, power is symbolized by the drum [Ngoma]. 
If you put your hands on the drum, it means you have power. What happens 
is that people are coming to put their hands on your arms holding the 
drum. Those people are your family and friends, the people of your group 
[ethnicity]. In that way they reap the benefits of power. But they also keep 
your hands pressed against the drum so they can continue to benefit. You 
don’t have a lot of freedom to manoeuvre and there is not much room for 
others to profit. The only means for them to access the drum and thus power 
is to violently chop off the arm reaching for the drum and holding up those 
other arms. The drum comes in the hands of another and other arms are 
mustered to support and to be supported by the drum.”
		 	 The	two	villages	in	post-genocide	context:
		 	 justice-governance-development
Graph 5 to 12 depict the rankings of respondents in Nta-
bona or Rukoma53. Table 5 and 6 indicate the perceived changes in the 
socio-economic profile of all households in Ntabona and Rukoma. It is 
the overall background against which to situate life and state policies 
in post-genocide Rwanda. We have to keep in mind that these socio-
economic categories, as explained in figure 1, are in general solid as a 
rock. Movement is, in normal circumstances, rather the exception than 
the rule. Rukoma currently has 644 households, 371 of them can be 
considered to be the same as before the genocide; 158 are newly es-
52	M.	 Ferme,	 The  Underneath  of  Things,  Violence, 
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tablished households by children of residents of Rukoma; 115 house-
holds migrated to Rukoma since 1994. We consider the change in so-
cio-economic situation of the 529 households that existed before or 
were established by off-spring. These newly established households 
are compared to the socio-economic situation of the parental unit as 
it is the economic starting point for newly established households to 
develop. 57,8 % did not experience any movement up or down. Only 
9,4% moved up in life,  32,7% experienced a decline over the past 15 
years. Of the 158 new households who experienced movement in rela-
tion to the situation of their parents, 15,8% moved upwards and 41,1% 
live according to a socio-economic status lower than their parents.54 
The dynamic of socio-economic change is similar for the 712 house-
holds of Ntabona, out of which 120 are newly established households 
connected to households living in the sector. 6% of them moved up, 
22,0% moved down and 71,9% did not experience any change. For the 
new households this entailed a status-quo for 42,5% compared to the 
status of the parental unit, 17,5% moved up, 40% moved down.
Table 7. Perceived Socio-Economic Change Rukoma 1990-2007 (N=529)
2007
Abatindi 
Nyakuja Abatindi Abakene Abakene
 Bifashiji Abakungu Abakire
1990
Abatindi
Nyakuja 72 1 0 3 0 0
Abatindi 2 25 7 4 5 0
Abakene 3 8 91 15 3 0
Abakene
Bifashiji 6 9 64 97 11 1
Abakungu 4 2 30 40 23 0
Abakire 1 0 1 1 2 2
 Table 8. Perceived Socio-Economic Change Ntabona 1990-2007 (N=712)
2007
Abatindi 
Nyakuja Abatindi Abakene Abakene
 Bifashiji Abakungu Abakire
1990
Abatindi
Nyakuja 53 1 0 1 0 0
Abatindi 6 42 7 4 0 0
Abakene 8 21 144 17 2 0
Abakene
Bifashiji 4 4 45 199 8 2
Abakungu 0 1 10 46 67 1
Abakire 0 0 0 6 6 7
54	We	have	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	current	socio-







is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 perceived	 micro-level	
recovery	on	the	household	level,	experienced	by	
households	who	were	in	the	country	in	1990	and	
went	trough	the	violent	decade	of	the	ninetees.	IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
Although the local dynamic during the genocide showed 
quiet some variation when comparing Ntabona and Rukoma, the un-
derlying motif and the final outcome was the same: massive violence 
against the Tutsi minority. While the Gacaca objectives are identical 
in both communities, the difference in the actual functioning of the 
courts is also apparent. 
The genocide in Rukoma was devastating, surpassing the 
imaginable: 12 758 persons killed in one month’s time. Revenge is the 
emotion prevailing in Rukoma since 1994, revenge against those that 
are left to take revenge on. It is not only an underlying tendency in the 
current Gacaca reunions, but structures interactions and daily life since 
94. Genocide survivors went to live in the houses of the Hutu families 
in exile in Congo since their own properties were destroyed. The return 
of these refugees created further animosity.  In the years following the 
genocide, the state implemented a villagization scheme in the area. 
Local NGOs build houses for the survivors much in need of shelter. The 
Hutu were obliged to destroy their own houses and to come and live 
‘next to the road’ as well. They did not receive any help or material to 
do so. This spurred further ethnic resentment. Power was seen to be 
siding with one ethnic group. Until today, the living conditions function 
as an element of segregation, the Gacaca activities as well. All Inyaga-
mugayo in Rukoma are Tutsi survivors – except for one cell, the neigh-
borhood were the Hutu live. It is a situation that does not increase the 
legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the Hutu. Moreover, observa-
tions of hundreds of trials in Rukoma, reveals that the Hutu population 
has hardly the chance to speak freely during the Gacaca sessions. They 
accept any accusation out of fear of being thrown in prison accused of 
harboring the genocide ideology. The Gacaca judges are hardly follow-
ing any of the procedures and function under severe pressure of the nu-
merous genocide survivors coming to assist in the trials. They greatly 
outnumber  the  Hutu  population.  Sometimes  decisions  are  simply 
rebuffed because the population does not want to follow the judges. 
Confessions are only very rarely accepted. 
A great number of the Hutu admits to have taken part in 
the extermination campaign or the looting activities or simply to have 
been present during this month of havoc. But most Tutsi inhabitants 
perished at the hands of outsiders to the village: the Burundian refu-
gees, the soldiers, the Interahamwe militia and the people that came 
to kill and pillage from other areas. These persons are unknown to the 
community or disappeared afterwards. Those that are left are those 
standing accused. On top of this already bleak picture, but in line with 
an already grim atmosphere, killings have taken place in the periphery 
of the Gacaca activities. A young Tutsi survivor was killed by a Hutu 
who  had  confessed  his  participation  in  the  genocide.  The  murder 
weapon was, again, a machete.  The motif, however, a row over a cow,  • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
unrelated to the past nor the Gacaca trials but nevertheless framed in 
the context of and explained with the omnipresent catchword ‘geno-
cide ideology’ to the outside world. Up to 10 Hutu villagers, half of 
them children, were killed in retaliation by a group of Tutsi genocide 
survivors. They also plundered and burned over 30 houses. The Hutu 
fled out of fear. The army intervened and the soldiers made a safe re-
turn of the Hutu possible. The names of the avengers are known to the 
Hutu villagers, to the police and judicial authorities, but none of them 
were arrested or tried. On the contrary, some Hutu were incarcerated 
on charges that they failed to provide security. The initial murder and 
the spontaneous revenge actions was a rare instance where the sim-
mering tensions between the two population groups were brought in 
the open. The reaction by the state and judicial authorities was an-
other proof in the perception of the Hutu that not everyone is equal 
before the law. During the next week Gacaca continued to “impartially 
deal with the past and foster reconciliation”. A great number of Hutu 
consider themselves to be ‘servile instruments’ in the hands of the 
Tutsi power-holders, using expressions referring to the feudal period. 
To no surprise, no one has raised the killings by the RPA in the after-
math of the genocide during the Gacaca sessions in Rukoma. Continued 
observations after this incident, but especially after the new modifi-
cation of the Gacaca law in March 2007 indicate that the heightened 
tensions between the groups are diminishing and that the sentences 
pronounced are less arbitrary and severe as before. But fear and frus-
tration lurk under the surface of daily life.
The social environment in Ntabona stands in stark con-
trast with the prospects for Rukoma. Distrust exists also in Ntabona 
and fragility permeates daily life as well. Co-habitation became the 
order of the day at the end of the 90s for a group of widows, who lost 
husband and children during the genocide. They were also grouped in 
a resettlement site at some distance from their previous homesteads. 
They live in the harsh circumstances of impoverishment because of 
having lost belongings and they are unable to rely on family, the first 
thing to turn to in times of distress and need. They prefer to stay in 
their small group of peers who experienced the same traumatic events. 
Interactions with Hutu happen in a stiff manner. And they were afraid 
after the arrival of liberated prisoners who confessed in prison from 
2003 onwards. Some of them had been incarcerated on their demand 
in the years following the genocide. Seeing them return, apparently 
free without constraints, made them fear for their lives. Another group 
of genocide survivors has refused to leave their original homes most 
probably  because  a  great  number  of  them  survived  the  genocide 
through the protection of Hutu. Family ties through ethnically mixed 
marriages proved to be an important countering power to the genocid-
al orders and violence. It’s a remarkable phenomenon that has made 
them decide to keep on living in their often remote homesteads. The IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
Hutu households that saved during the genocide function as a beacon 
in the sea of suspicion characterizing the social landscape in the post-
genocide era. Also these Tutsi survivors distrust the great majority of 
the Hutu population and prefer to rely on members of the own group. 
During the genocide, they were in hiding so they are unaware of all who 
participated. They saw some and suspect others based on rumors and 
information obtained through third parties. They hoped the Gacaca 
could bring clarity on these matters, especially on the locations where 
the bodies of some of their loved ones where thrown. The exhumation 
of the body of disappeared family members is an important prereq-
uisite to arrive at a symbolic closure with regards to the past. Hutu 
hoped that Gacaca might liberate their family members imprisoned 
since years without a file or a trial. 
Numerous observations show that Gacaca sessions in 
Ntabona function as envisioned by the organic laws and the instruc-
tions of the SNJG. Procedures are followed and everyone, apparently, 
‘participates’ as prescribed. However, the first phase of the Gacaca 
process  during  which  information  was  collected  was  marked  by  a 
heightened polarization between the different ethnic groups. Terror 
was taking root due to the fact that it was impossible to defend oneself 
or others against accusations. This sentiment diminished when the tri-
al phase started and interventions from all sides become a possibility. 
While before the same persons were always cited when referring to the 
leaders during the genocide, people that had initially tried to evade 
their own responsibility started to accept their part in the upheaval of 
the past. But Gacaca brought about a lot of tensions in the community 
due to the fact that people accused each other of genocide crimes. An 
older men philosophically remarked: “I am wondering when we are go-
ing to hold a Gacaca to deal with the conflicts arising from the  Gacaca 
sessions related to the genocide.” 
And as in Rukoma, killings took place as well since Gacaca 
started. A local judge, Tutsi genocide survivor was killed. The security 
forces rounded up a number of genocide convicts that had appealed to 
their judgment and were thus awaiting further trial proceedings in the 
community. Several were killed in custody by the armed forces in retal-
iation and brought to the village with the message that ‘this happens 
with beast that learned to kill (during the genocide)’. None of them 
had probably anything to do with the initial killing of the Gacaca judge 
that was most probably a result of a family feud. But this possibility 
was never seriously considered. The revenge killings created panic and 
unexpressed fear among the inhabitants. Also for the genocide survi-
vors, who felt that through the police actions the Hutu thought they 
had instigated the armed forces to resort to theses actions. With no 
further actions undertaken afterwards, calm returned and the fragile 
Gacaca process resumed. But almost none dared to appeal against a 
verdict, as those killed in retaliation had done. Most of the prisoners 
returned in the meantime to start community service in the village. 6 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
This has diminished the resentment among the Hutu population that 
saw large groups of male adults disappear in custody since the start 
of Gacaca. Their return creates new problems however. People fierce in 
their denouncing of former participants in the genocide, now see those 
return of which they thought they would remain locked up for a long 
time. This is especially the case for genocide survivors who decided to 
rest their case and refused to actively participate in the Gacaca trials 
happening after the return of the prisoners. They found some consola-
tion in the restitution they receive through the Gacaca sessions related 
to property offences, often taking place through an amicable settle-
ment.
	 4.	 some	ConCludIng	remArks	
We didn’t ask respondents explicitly to make a compari-
son between pre- and post-genocide Rwanda. But the findings from 
the subjective ranking exercise and the accompanying narratives give 
us an opportunity to glance at what it means to live through a ‘political 
transition’, from one regime into another, from ‘peace’ over violence 
into ‘peace’. More analysis is necessary to fully explore the multiple di-
mensions in the rankings and narratives to understand differences and 
similarities according to ethnic group or the subgroups such as prison-
ers, those accused in Gacaca etc, to understand the similarities and dif-
ferences across rankings, to explore the semantics of word choice, the 
effects of specific policies such as the installation of the Gacaca courts 
and policy initiatives affecting the economic domain, the particularity 
of locality, etcetera.
Further exploration is also necessary when relating these 
perceptions to the critical rethinking of “transition paradigm”. The 
rankings themselves don’t give us a full insight into the type of re-
gime that emerged after the genocide. A further exploration of actual 
practices and observations of the state-society relationship need to 
substantiate these elements in connection with a top-down analysis 
of the ideological, procedural and behavioural attributes of the subse-
quent regimes summarized in tables 2, 3 and 4.55
In this paper we limited ourselves to explore a ‘structural 
feature’ underlying the Rwandan transition: ethnicity. The graphs with 
rankings visually paint the trajectory the Rwandan transition took af-
ter its departure. The most striking element in the results of the rank-
ing exercise is this reversal of perceived ethnic dominance. While Hutu 
had the upper hand before 1994, Tutsi are on top of Hutu rankings in 
the post-genocide rankings. Hutu are more confident than Tutsi, but 
feel less politically represented. Tutsi on the other hand score high for 
political representation after 94, while in their perception they live in 
an inimical social environment being the untrustworthy Hutu in their 
55	See	especially	the	paper	by	M.	Rafti	providing	
a	macro-oriented	analysis	of	Rwanda’s	political	
transition	 that	 should	 be	 read	 in	 parallel	 with	
this	paper.	M.	Rafti,	“A Bungled Path to Democracy: 
Political  Transition  and  Authoritarian  Consolidation 
in  Rwanda,”	paper	presented	at	the	Conference	
“Deepening  Democracy  in  Divided  Societies”,	 Cape	
Town,	South	Africa,	19-21	September	2007.	IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 • 7 Living the Transition
communities or on the outside of Rwanda The reversal of dominance, 
therefore, needs to be attributed to the scores on the feeling of “po-
litical representation” and “security”, the latter hinging on the former 
since the feeling of security emanates from the perceived nature of 
power. It is here that ethnicity comes in the equation. 
How to interpret this change? By looking at power in its 
overt manifestation and in its disguises.56 The graphic results of this 
subjective ranking exercise presented and commented upon in this 
paper portray the cartography of the perceived interrelation of power 
and identity that structured and continues to structure Rwandan so-
cio-political landscape and everyday life. Previously, several authors 
have explored this theme, often in an attempt to understand that 
which brought about the genocide. The ideological underpinnings of 
the Rwandan Republics (1963-1973 & 1973-1994) “constituted both 
a reversal and a continuation of [these] long-standing psychocultural 
images”57 of the foreign, racially superior Tutsi pastoralist and native, 
subaltern Hutu cultivator that had been reinforced under colonial rule. 
Hutu and Tutsi remained distinct categories after the social revolution, 
but Tutsi became now “matter out of place”, the inferior creatures in a 
newly regained natural order of Hutu homogeneity. “In the neo-tradi-
tionalist 1931-59 version, the petits Tutsi felt proud of belonging to the 
‘ethnic aristocracy’, although it brought them very little beyond the 
sense of superiority. Now [after the Hutu revolution] it was the Hutu 
who fell prey to the same error and mostly persuaded themselves that 
because the government was Hutu, they, the humble peasants from 
the hills, somehow shared in that power.”58 Reyntjens, referring to Le-
marchand, notes with regard to the impact of the 1959 “Hutu” revolu-
tion on the socio-political organization of Rwandan society that “there 
had been a change in the occupants of the roles but no major change in 
the structuring of the roles.”59 
Apparently, the current rankings reveal a similar process 
at work.  It solicits a further exploration of the micro-politics of power: 
how power is and was institutionalized and behaviourally practiced 
and how it was/is exercised in its ideological – agentive - or hegem-
onic mode and the possibly contradictatory nature of the two domains. 
But it is also about how power is culturally constructed and has been 
historically transferred as the statements quoted in the last sections 
reveal. Those statements reflect, to a certain extent, a “wisdom” em-
bedded in Rwandan custom or tradition, but even more a mere inter-
pretation of the alternation of power in the course of Rwandan history 
and its repercussions for the ordinary populace during the event itself 
and in the aftermath. Although history and culture should not func-
tion as a deterministic explanatory framework, they render actions 
and events meaningful for those involved.60 Dimensions that require 
further exploration of the narratives collected and practices observed 
to further contextualize the perceptions presented here.
56	J.	 Gledhill,	 Power  and  its  Disguises.  Anthropo-
logical Perspectives on Politics,	London:	Pluto	Press,	
1994.
57	P.	 Uvin,	 Aiding  Violence.  The  Development 
Enterprise in Rwanda,	Connecticut:	Kumarian	Press	
Inc.,	1998,	p.	33
58	G.	 Prunier,	 The  Rwandan  Crisis:  History  of  a 
Genocide,	 New	 York:	 Columbia	 University	 Press,	
1995,	p.	80.
59	F.	Reyntjens,	Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda. Droit 
Public  et  Evolution  Politique,  1916-1973,	 (Tervuren	 :	
Musée	Royal	de	L’Afrique	Centrale,	1985).	(Trans-
lated	by	the	author)
60	P.	Chabal	&	J.-P.	Daloz,	Culture Troubles. Politics 
and the Interpretation of Meaning,	London:	Hurst	
&	Company,	2006.	&		J.	Gledhill,	op.cit.	For	the	
Rwandan	 context	 de	 Lame	 notes::	 “Rwandan	
mentalities	 are	 still	 imbued	 with	 a	 spiraling	
conception	of	time,	as	shown	by	the	pervading	
ideological	 recourse	 to	 (considerably	 falsified)	
history	to	justify	the	present	(Des	Forges	1995).	
Any	important	new	event	harks	back	to	a	similar,	
earlier	 period,	 especially	 when	 it	 touches	 on	
historical	identity.	[…]	Being	unique,	the	source	
of	 power	 remains	 incompatible	 with	 shared	
authority,	be	it	cohabitation	with	a	rival	or	the	
republican	separation	of	powers.”	D.	de	Lame,	A 
Hill Among a Thousand. Transformations and Ruptures 
in  Rural  Rwanda,	 Madison:	 The	 University	 of	
Wisconsin	Press,	2005,	p.	482. • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 Living the Transition
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	 	 APPendIx	1		four	(lIfe)	storIes
BOX 1  The Life Story of André. 85 years of Rwanda’s History Experienced Through the Eyes and Practices of a Hutu Peasant of Ntabona.
I was born here in 1921. This here is the land of my father. I have given part of the land to my son.  My daughter lives here as well. She has got a child, but the 
father is a protestant and so I have withheld my consent to marry someone from another religion.  I lived here with my mother, as my father had two wives.  I 
was about twenty years old when I started my family [+/- 1940]. At that time the situation was better; I had cows and I worked for the Tutsi patrons as a cli-
ent. [when referring to clientship, he uses the words guhakwa (servant) and umugaragu (client) reference to the Ubuhake clientship institution]. But there was a chief in 
( ….). Here there were only seconds-in-command (sous-chefs). There were clients working for him, others worked for themselves. We took turns in the house 
of the patron: we stayed a certain time to work in the lords kitchen or to tend cattle. Afterwards we could return home. But there was also the uburetwa [forced 
labour] : the chef called upon you to do small jobs.
I became a client at the end of the famine called Ruzagayura. We went into a Tutsi family where we were four.  They could have a number of them. It was a kind 
of servant’s work: we looked for wood and we had to do the cooking.  There were four of us but not all completed the job as we were beaten there.  The other 
three are dead but I got my cow at the end. There was a lot of violence because you were beaten with a stick when you were told that you had not worked hard 
enough.  In the morning we had to find water, then we went looking for wood in the wilderness and afterwards we started preparing the meal. We made rota-
tions as the families in which we worked, the Tutsi – husband, wife and children – did not do anything at all.  After two months we could return home because 
there were also married men.  You had to be a client to get a cow, that was the only way. I was wealthy at the time, I had cows and above all the strength to 
work. I spent two months with them and then I returned to my family to work for myself.
[In addition to the Tutsi chief there were also] the ordinary Tutsi families settled (on the hill).  They had taken up their residence there a long time ago. The Tutsi 
of (…) have always lived there; I have always known it like that.  They were mixed up with the Hutu.  At that time you could not see any distinction between 
the Hutu and the Tutsi.  It is during the war that the big distinction was made. When the patrons were here, also these Tutsi families went to work for them 
in order to get a cow.  The Tutsi also worked for the patron but they did not share with the Hutu. And as far as work is concerned, they only did small jobs like 
collect straw.  The big jobs - cleave wood, working the fields - were for the Hutu.  The Tutsi were also servants but only for the small jobs. As far as the meals 
are concerned, after the patron had eaten, it was the Tutsi; they did not eat together with the Hutu.  The Tutsi had to stay less time to get a cow even if they 
only did the easier jobs. The others sometimes had to stay some years.
Clientship came to an end under the reign of Rudahigwa [former Tutsi king at that time, between 1931-1959]: the period of dividing the cows. Before that one 
went to work for a family and one got a cow, but then Rudahigwa said that we had to divide the cows in a fair way.  It is Rudahigwa who said that there was 
an excess [in clientship]. After the period of clientelism, I kept the cows that I had received. Until this very moment the cows that I have now are offspring of 
those cows. Now I have two cows here descendants of those. But I have given two cows to my nephew at the occasion of a newborn child. After giving birth 
to a calf, the calf was given to my daughter. 
 Even when I was asked to work hard, I have received cows.  I felt secure.  I travelled, talked to people and the relations were good.
When I was still young, I went to Uganda to visit my two brothers and also to look for a job.  That was from 1940 on, at the end of the famine called Ruza-
gayura. It was in the period of the war when the soldiers had finished the war in Eritrea. There were Rwandese there in Uganda who had participated in the 
war, looking for a job.
We went togethere in a group of persons.  We looked for some money and wrapped some food to go to (…), province of (…), where there were customs collec-
tors.  There were periods when we went there in groups of 5 – 10 persons.  We stayed there for three days.  There we did « uburetwa » [forced labour]. There 
was a muzungu [white man], but also the personnel to organise the work for the muzungu.  After having done those works, we had to undergo medical test to 
pick over the sick.  After that we arrived in the English zone.  I remember from that period that there were Rwandese refugees there. It was 1946.  We went to 
find somebody to work in his big field and someone called me.  It was somebody who came from Rwanda; together we had had the training to prepare mar-
riage. It were Rwandese refugees who were there.  There was a little war there between Hutu and Tutsi, but the one I met was a Hutu.  Yes, yes, even before, 
there was a war between the ethnic groups. 
I stopped going to Uganda twenty years ago, when my eldest brother died there.  From 1970 on till 1975 I also worked for the white parish priest of the 
neighbouring sector.  I worked on the watertanks.  I had a feeling of security, I could do the job.  I felt good as I worked for the Muzungu [White] priest. When 
the other priests came [in 2001], I did no longer work on the watertanks.  Nothing was given to me to thank me for my work.During the revolution [1959 Hutu 
revolution], all chiefs were arrested and taken to prison in (…).  They were called together in (…) and they never returned. They left for abroad.  Before the revo-
lution it was good;  the population lived in harmony.  After it also, but orders were given from higher authorities. […]   In the very beginning it was good, the 
people lived well. We worked and followed the orders from above. There was no Uburetwa. […] For me nothing had changed except that we had to go to the 
polls. But for the population nothing had changed.  There were the political parties like PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA et RADAR during the period of Kayibanda. 
And also UNAR.  They organized meetings to prepare the elections, etc.  It was the period of Mbonyumutwa et Kayibanda. During he period of Habyarimana 
it was good but he was alone, there was nobody to contradict him (yaravugana rikijyana). Under Kayibanda it was not as before: there were political parties. In 
the end he had become like that.  Under Habyarimana the leaders were in charge, there was nothing special. When there was a need for somebody to take up 
the position of authority, one called everybody in the sector together to vote.  One proceeded to the pre-selection.  Candidates were presented and the one 
with most votes won. It is currently the same thing. After the vote the one who would be in charge was presented.
The confidence had diminished in 1990 because it was said that Tutsi and Hutu were waging war.  After the genocide we thought of fleeing the country.  We 
had taken all luggage to leave but we finally left it behind.  Almost the whole population had fled towards the cell of (…..), in the eucalyptus forest, but after 
three days we came back.  We thought that the present military [RPA-soldiers / rebels at the time] could kill us.  After the massacres and after the people who 
had fled had come back, confidence returned bit by bit.  I had confidence but not complete.  People who had done nothing, were arrested, so I was afraid that 
I would also be arrested.
My economic situation worsened after I got ill and after my wife died and also my cows. That was in 1995.  Currently, my economic situation is not good;  I 
have not very much property.  And with the surgery on my stomach I had to undergo, I was told to reduce the hard labour a bit.  I have even problems with my 
arms to harvest coffee. I only have little security due to my health.  In April I went for a medical examination and  the doctor who had examined me said that 
everything was normal  but I feel ill. I got a prescription for three different drugs but I only received two.
Having a feeling of security is when there are no people that tell things against you, when you can talk to the people smoothly, when there is nobody that 
accuses you of anything.  I have trust in others and this is in everybody.  I can go ask things to the others.  I have not had any period in my life that I did not 
have confidence in people. 
On the Gacaca : there are people who have committed crimes. One tries to put them on the same line as the others [re-educate them]. Even for those who have 
done nothing, it is ok. I know the old Gacaca.  There was the war before, houses of the Tutsi were burnt down and they fled; that was at the time of Kayibanda.  
There had been a period of war when people killed one another.  But after a certain time people returned to their homes.  No, one has not used Gacaca at that 
time here. There is a difference between the current Gacaca and the old one. The current Gacaca throws people into jail. The difference is that currently notes 
are taken down while in the earlier times Gacaca was only to talk between the people and to go on living together. The current Gacaca is enormously complex.  
They can say:  that one has joined a [attacking] group [ibitero] and they can arrest you even if you have not done anything. You can look at someone, accuse him 
and he is jailed.  The ones that have been considered guilty are those who have led group attacks, but even the others can be put into prison.  I am not against 
the current Gacaca, even if someone is arrested on the base of testimonies, he can later be released again.
The political changes are a source of great concern to me.  I have seen many changes and I am worried that it will go on.  But at my age it will go on. I am not 
represented [by the current  authorities] because they ask a lot of money.  And they ask money for everything. For me the representation is not easy.  Things 
are asked to have oneself taken care of [mutuelle de santé - social security].  Things are asked from people like me who do not have anything. But paying is com-
pulsory.  How can I find that money?  Me, who has no more strength.  I see that with my eyes, but I can not say anything. I turn my eyes to God, not towards 
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There are people having rights to do certain things and others without any right.  It are the authorities that give the orders and have the rights.  For instance, 
now, the authorities give the order not to let the cattle leave the sheds.  I do not know how future will be with this kind of orders.  I do not see the origin of 
these things.  I have participated in the latest local elections.  Candidates were introduced and we were told to elect the one we considered capable of govern-
ing.  The candidates were first ligned up and we had to go stand behind one of those candidates.
In the past, in the period of Habyarimana, I felt represented ; the authorities could solve our problems.  It was better then.  Under the reign of Kayibanda, I 
also felt represented although he was not elected by the population.  When comparing the periods before and after the war, there are authorities that govern 
as the others and others that govern differently. Previously it was Kinyarwanda, now it are the foreign languages that govern; they talk “Kizungu”  [strange 
– unfamiliar – foreign languages/discourses] before talking Kinyarwanda. But for a peasant like me, the most important thing is to have peace.
(Interviews  Ntabona, 2004-2007)
Box. 2  The (Life) Story of Sévérine, genocide survivor Ntabona
Sévérine was born in 1956 in a sector [village] near to Ntabona. In 1974, she came to Ntabona to get married. Although she is currently officially considered 
as a genocide survivor (rescapé) and insists that she is Tutsi, local inhabitants argue that she is in fact Hutu. Her husband was Tutsi: a farmer, but he also had 
a small shop, where he repaired clothing and sold these on markets in the region. “After the marriage, we had large plots of land. We had a cow and sheep, 
plots of land and coffee trees, we could charge a full truck without any problem.”  Her husband had obtained a sewing machine which allowed him, together 
with his brother, to gain an off-farm income. In the meantime, Sévérine would cultivate the fields and employ wage labourers. Social relations were good, but 
“because of our richness, we attracted envy and hatred.” Together they had three children, born in 1976, 1977 and 1979. Her husband died at beginning of the 
eighties due to a disease. “Life became difficult when my husband died. Only when the children grew up, life became better again.”
 Beginning of the nineties, Sévérine belonged to several agricultural associations. The members cultivated sugar cane in the valley of the river (...). These 
associations were ethnically mixed. But due to the war with the RPF and upcoming polarization of social life during the period when multi-party politics was 
introduced , Sévérine was excluded from the association. Also in that period, in 1992, a local teacher who would become a local ringleader in the genocide 
later on would not pass messages from a secondary school in the province of Gikongoro to Sévérine because of her ‘ethnic identity’ or at least that of her 
children. The child got expelled from school because of this. In that period, “there was not a single authority looking after us”.
When the plane of Habyarimana was shot down, Sévérine’s children became the target of the violence. “When I went to cultivate after the plane crash, peo-
ple started to call me names. (…) asked where my son was. They said they needed him to participate in the ‘rondes’, the patrols to maintain security. I told 
him I would send him, when he came back. A certain day, I saw a large group of Tutsi families who had come to seek refuge in the buildings of the parish. At 
night a local teacher came knocking on our door asking me to send my children. I did not open the door. They came in group and I heard whispering: “when 
you want someone, you will have to proceed very carefully.” The next day, my son told me they had pillaged the houses of the families of (…) and (…), two 
Tutsi families. I decided to leave.”
Sévérine took the children with her to a neighbouring sector, her place of origin, to hide them. Going there she had to pass several barriers installed on the 
roads. She has been beaten there several times and she now has scares coming from machete blows on her arms. She stayed in the sector of her parents for 
about a month. Someone from Ntabona had sent messages to the local authorities over there to send her children to the people of Ntabona. Once discovered 
the people over there obliged her to send the children back to Ntabona, so they could be killed where they came from. Sévérine followed these orders and re-
turned. “I arrived in Ntabona at night. (…) came to take my children. They transported them to the river. (…) took my children at the legs to smash their heads 
against the rocks. The next morning I went to look for their bodies. I almost turned crazy. The dogs had starting eating the flesh of their bodies.”
After the genocide Sévérine stayed alone in her house surrounded by people or their family members who had participated in the killing of her children and the 
looting of her house. In 1998 she sold her property and went to live in an Umudugudu [resettlement site] for genocide survivors in a neighbouring sector some 3 
kilometers from her former home and fields. “In 1995 and 1996 they started arresting those suspected of participation in the genocide. Security was assured 
then. There were always soldiers close to us. I felt represented by the authorities at the time. Even now, but the Gacaca is a problem.” 
Her most intense social relationships are with other genocide survivors, her neighbours in the Umudugudu. “Confidence means that there is no one running 
behind you and aims at doing bad. I am generally confident in people that work together with me and speak the truth.” Together with another female geno-
cide survivor she is the head of Ibuka, the association of genocide survivors and controls the distribution of FARG assistance to the survivors in the area. But 
she is not satisfied with this assistance: “Ibuka doesn’t help at all, except for the survivors with children. People like me, without children being survivor don’t 
get anything. I hear on the radio that there is help from the FARG fund for the most vulnerable, but there is no one that comes here. It stays without result. 
You hear them talking on the radio but when you go and ask [at the district], they say the money available is used up.” Her only possessions are a pick axe, a 
small chair and table and a radio. Regularly she returns to the sector to cultivate the fields or attend the Gacaca sessions. 
She has trouble sleeping, she feels useless, without confidence and incapable of taking decisions. Her living conditions and the loss of her children makes her 
live in conflict with virtually the entire population of her former sector. She has accused people in Gacaca that later turned out to be innocent. Hutu inhabit-
ants feel a tension when Sévérine and the other rescapés arrive in the sector. The other women, Hutu mention: “We try to talk to them, but when they get an-
gry, we have to keep silent. […] For us, there is no obstacle to reconciliation, but the survivors think that everything they say needs to be followed  literally.”
In 2006 she also became Inyangamugayo, judge in the Gacaca court, after other judges had to be replaced because of their alleged involvement in the geno-
cide or affiliation with suspects. She is not happy with the way Gacaca functions: “Gacaca works, but not very well. I have lost my children. I saw the people 
[that took my children] and when I went to give a testimony, everyone turned against me, saying that I was lying. The people that are with me in the committee 
[of judges] have family implicated. They have relationships with those people. It are their children and uncles.” During one of the Gacaca sessions, one of the 
inhabitants argued that Sévérine is also responsible for the death of her children, since she had sent them back to the sector herself. Sévérine was deeply hurt 
due to this statement and went to file a complaint at the district office saying that the people of Ntabona continued to hurt the survivors and tried to make 
them responsible for the genocide. Authorities held several reunions with the population, also provoked by allegations made by other surviors, to make sure 
that one would leave behind the ‘genocide ideology’.
Reconciliation seems an utmost impossibility for Sévérine: “They have killed my children in a brutal way. They have thrown a rock on the head of one [starts 
crying] Those people have committed serious crimes. They pillaged and destroyed my belongings. We  are getting old, we don’t have any force left. […] Those 
people who are in prison don’t want me to be alive. They wonder there in prison, whether I am still alive or not. The same for their families, the relations are 
not good. They don’t tell the truth. Do you think a prisoner will come here ask for forgiveness and reconcile? I don’t think so. For me neither. It will not be easy. 
[…] The state puts a lot of pressure for reconciliation, but I have undergone those actions. The state can do what it wants, it doesn’t concern me.” She does 
not feel very secure. “Security means that one has peace and that the conversations with others are good, as they were before. Currently, you salute someone 
and he is not responding. […] The relations are not good because they [other villagers – Hutu] say that we want everyone in prison so that we [survivors] can stay 
alone in the country. When you arrive somewhere people stop talking and they whisper: ‘ah, the group [of survivors] that wants to send everyone to prison.”
She considers her prospects for the future very bleak: “ If God wants, there can be security. I wish life in the community will be better and with security. Cur-
rently, when I go to the commercial centre [a place with small shops and bars], I sit down and everyone leaves. All of that are the consequences of the war and 
Gacaca. If Gacaca had not  taken place, the relations would not have been as bad as they are now. They put people in prison? Why? Is it going to give back 
the dead?”
(Observations &  Interviews  Ntabona, 2004-2007)
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Box 3  Sylvère. The (life) story of a released prisoner and confessed “génocidair”
I was born in 1966 in (….) I have never lived anywhere else.  I married in 1990 and was in prison from 1994 till 2003.
My current economic situation is not good.  My home could collapse any time. I have mended it but because of that I have a debt of 30.000 FRW with my 
brother-in-law who lives in Kigali.  Before 1994 I was better of, I did not have any problems.  Everything was ok, we danced and sang songs. I was not among 
the rich of the village, but we cultivated the land and had good crops; we could even go to the market to sell products. I was part of several agricultural asso-
ciations in the river valley. I tilled our fields, I grew beans and sweet potatoes. I consumed the harvest slowly. I currently have the same fields, but the family 
has grown and that is the reason why I have problems; there is less for more. At my imprisonment I had two children. After it another two and that makes it 
difficult. Particularly after my liberation that I saw that it was no longer as before. The harvest is less and the chickens are ill; there is an epidemic. That is the 
reason why I have come to a standstill.
Since birth, I have always known that there were good relations within the population. There were mixed marriages, drinking was shared. There were no 
problems. That situation changed during the war. We often heard the sound of bombardments in the distance coming from the battlefield. But all was calm 
here. I did not envisage that there would be massacres here. After the plane crash, all started, the population was worried. People living on the other side of 
the river [refugees from the North displaced by the ongoing war with the RPF] said the president had been killed by the Tutsi. That’s why they, on the other side of 
the river, started throwing Tutsi in the river. But some could swim and crossed. They came in hiding here. 
After a while, it also started here. People from a neighbouring sector came here. We asked them what they were doing and they replied that “they were work-
ing as anyone else” [the word ‘working’ was used to refer to participation in the extermination campaign]. They said everyone had to protect himself against the 
Tutsi, that they wanted revenge. Rondes [patrols] were organized against the Tutsi with only Hutu participating. The national authorities came to incite us 
saying that “everyone needed to be aware of the common enemy” and that we “needed to look for them, the Tutsi”. 
I was part of the attacking groups [igitero] looking for and chasing Tutsi in hiding. We went to search the houses of Hutu families to verify whether there were 
Tutsi in hiding. When we found someone, we transported him or her to the river. They were stripped from their clothes, sometimes tied with ropes and beaten 
with sticks. [Turns his eyes to the ground] I was there, but I have not done those things. The houses of the Tutsi were already destroyed at that point. We want 
to verify with the known Hutu friends of Tutsi, people that had exchanged a cow in the past. Sometimes we also threatened these Hutu. In total we found 9 
persons in this way.
We participated in a voluntary way. Some just followed in the back. Motivations to participate varied, some to plunder, to eat and pillage or to cultivate the 
fields. The responsible and the conseiller [local authorities] never really tried to stop the killings. They could have. Personally, for me, I learned in school how 
the Hutu had been mistreated in the past. When I heard the Tutsi would return, I thought, no, the Tutsi can never return. Most of us had these type of ideas. 
The old people explained younger people that if the old regime would return, we would all die. 
Yes, yes, the majority of the people of my neighbourhood was involved in the massacres. The way I observed it – even if I was not everywhere - the majority 
has played a role.  The majority has participated in destroying the houses, etc. The people that were together with me in the attacking groups have never been 
imprisoned before the start of Gacaca. They are afraid now.
When we were in prison, we were tranquil. But when you consider the household, you realize they have a difficult time. The wife was alone. We were some-
times badly treated in prison, but not all the time. Somebody is in security when he is at home, when he does not pester anyone and when he follows the rules 
of the government.
Confidence is when you see somebody’s face and when he can do good for you as you do for him. Since the collection of the information [start of Gacaca], it has 
become worse. But the District Authorities have come to soothe the population.  We often went to meetings with the authorities. After these, the threats 
decreased as people thought they would be brought to court.
There were quite a number of people happy to see me back after my liberation in 2003. The day of my letting out I was welcomed because the people did not 
know that we had given testimony in prison on what had happened [during the genocide].  There has been a change since the beginning of Gacaca. When we 
were asked to tell the truth, I gave my testimony. I have mentioned the names of the people involved. At that moment, they began to say: “you see, he is our 
enemy, he want to eliminate us also”.  But it is only with the people involved that the relations are bad. With the others, even the survivors, relations are good.  
Those that were implicated in the violence say that we want to eliminate them also.
The people that were not involved and that have not suffered the consequences are good.  But the people that were involved and/or have given evidence have 
to be intelligent, I mean, they have to pay attention. When somebody has a ceremony, they leave you aside [don’t invite you].
A lot of people do not tell the truth, except those that have confessed and asked forgiveness.  This is to hide what they know. They are afraid that they would 
be asked where they got that information from.  Thus, it means that they will be asked where they were at that moment, so that they could be accused of 
being with the attacking group. And if they give a genuine evidence, they might also accuse members of their own family.  They are afraid of being accused in 
turn. These people, there are some that can say what they have seen (….).  Others who have not joined but who know what has happened do not say anything 
because they say it is only for those that have already confessed to their crimes like me.
A small number of people tell the truth. That is the only positive aspect of Gacaca. There was even a time when I regretted being released from prison by 
the State because of the problems with the other people in the village. And the families that we have treated badly behave nicely towards us.  Yes, yes, I 
have wished at a certain moment to be in prison.  I have had more problems than those who stayed in jail.  But now, it has changed.  The State has given us 
confidence and we do not have to fear anything.  But at that moment I thought it was the State that had imposed the things in that way, so that we could be 
treated badly and lose our heads.
The person who currently wants to hurt me more than the others is a certain (….) who has never been in prison. I charge him with particpating in the attacking 
group I was also part of.  When I speak out his name, he becomes extremely furious.  As he is my closest neighbour, he says that I can kill him, even so I am not 
the only one to accuse him.  During the genocide there were nephews of him hiding in his place, they were killed and since that day, he condemns me saying 
that I was leading the attack against his nephews.  Yes, I was in the mob but the attack was lead by the former responsible of the cell and it is mainly by this 
incident that I was in prison; it was that man who made me imprison.
The relations with the survivors are good.  When I make a confession, I am thanked because they do not know what happened.  There are even others who 
come and ask more information about what happened. They come therefore from other places. They thank us. The survivors have some knowledge of what 
happened; they were hiding but they saw something or some persons.  The survivors  regret that a lot of people do not speak the truth.
One feels represented when you can appeal to the authorities and when they respond to your request quickly and in the correct way. In the time before the 
war I was even a local leader. I was tenth in the committee of the cell; this proves that things went well for me.  There was the war after 1990 but it worked. 
Before that there was one single (political) party, afterwards the MDR was founded.  They came to my place to make me a member, threatening me with words.  
I am currently not very well represented.  You often assist at meetings with authorities where it is said that the released must be thanked for giving evidence 
etc. But the next day we hear that these released prisoners need to be kept an eye on. I do not feel very secure, when I sleep and the wind blows I think that 
they come to arrest me and throw me into jail.
For the future, I received a cow from my brother-in-law. The cow is going to calve and I am going to improve my situation. I have 4 children and will stay with 
this. I hope to stay out of prison. Sometimes, I sit down and think about what happened [during the genocide]. I hope that what happened will not return. I 
wish that the truth prevails. 
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Box 4 – Cyrille, the (life) story of a Tutsi genocide survivor - Ntabona
I was born here in 1957. In 1978 I went to Kibungo. I spent three years there, but life was difficult, so I came back here: problems of drought and malaria. I 
realized that it was impossible to create a living there. We had bought parcels of land but we left everything behind, we did not even sell them. In 1982 I 
married here. Around 1986 I went to [the neighbouring sector] until 1994. The plot here was too small.  It was small but fertile.  Only to keep livestock I had 
to move.  Life there was excellent. I left because of the war. I came back here. During the genocide I fled to [location somewhere in the sector]. After the 
genocide I returned here into this house. Since my birth until the beginning of the war I felt absolutely secure. Anybody could ever imagine that would hap-
pen what has happened. It was since 1990 that they began to kill the Abogogwe, members of a Tutsi clan. They were breeders. One has begun to kill them 
in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.
Here the war [referring to the genocide] was not what it was elsewhere.  Even if there were attacks, there were also counter-attacks.  A group of Interahamwe 
came as I had quite a lot of property.  They came and destroyed the house by burning it.  They took 8 cows and ate them.  We succeeded in escaping.  The 
whole family fled except for my father, who did not have the strength.  He was thrown into the river together with the children of my sister.  I left with the 
family and we went to hide in families in Ntabona. Some were friends, other family members.  They tried to hide us as they were family. We only asked to live, 
hunger and thirst were forgotten. Those who hid us are still alive. They were on the watch to see whether there were attacks and to organize resistance. And 
then we were saved because the Identity Card indicated that we were Hutu. We were lucky because our parents had changed that before. Part of the popula-
tion knew we were Tutsi; they suspected us.
From the people who have attacked us and looted our house, there are some in prison but others are still free. They have done this because of the bad leaders; 
but those who have followed are also bad, otherwise they would not have accepted to do this. Those who are in prison have had their punishment, the others 
have to restore the goods. If they do this, I can accept it, otherwise they must be punished. Some of the people that have taken our property have restored it, 
others have not. At a certain moment the currency was changed. Then there were people coming with old money that we could no longer use. When they gave 
us the money, it was the period of change, but when we went to the bank with it, it was too late to change it.
On top of what happened in 1994 there was also the period 1996-1997 in which there were infiltrators [abacengezi].  We were desperate. We spent the night 
outside looking for shelter.  We cultivated the land but during the night we went into the wilderness.  That was 1997 and it lasted for a year. Afterwards the 
situation has ameliorated up till now; we organized nocturnal patrols to increase security.
The state had promised help but given nothing.  In another district, people received something but not here.  We got corrugated sheets from Caritas. I have 
a child in secondary school whom the fees are paid for by FARG.  But those in primary school must be paid for as well.
If the current economic situation continues like this, it is ok.  But we are not at ease.  The Gacaca, judgements must come to an end. After that we will be at 
ease.  In 1995 we were really down and out; we did not have anything. We lived from the help of the people, we only had a small house. And then we began to 
cultivate land and grow cattle. Recently we have had a problem of drought. Today my level is lower than before the war. Before I had cows, money and a nice 
house.  Afterwards it was worse, but it begins to improve again.  But, during the judgment phase of Gacaca it is going to be even more difficult. The implicated 
ones are going to be judged.  That might cause problems between the Inyangamugayo and those accused. The majority of the people in the cell are implicated, 
so they do not want the truth to be clarified.
Before the war I had confidence in other people.  We had confidence in others because we heard that there was war in other countries but not here.  Since 1994 
my confidence in other people has diminished.  There is now a large part of the population that I do not trust.  I trust only those persons who have not been 
involved in the genocide. The relations have improved a bit ; for instance the persons who have been released testify, but these testimonies are not complete. 
Therefore, the relations are not good; they are mediocre. There is not very much truth.  But, me, I have no great problems: I have given two daughters to Hutu 
families [for marriage].
The state had promised help but given nothing.  In another district, people received something but not here.  We got corrugated sheets from Caritas. I have 
a child in secondary school whom the fees are paid for by FARG.  But those in primary school must be paid for as well.
If the current economic situation continues like this, it is ok.  But we are not at ease.  The Gacaca, judgements must come to an end. After that we will be at 
ease.  In 1995 we were really down and out; we did not have anything. We lived from the help of the people, we only had a small house. And then we began to 
cultivate land and grow cattle. Recently we have had a problem of drought. Today my level is lower than before the war. Before I had cows, money and a nice 
house.  Afterwards it was worse, but it begins to improve again.  But, during the judgment phase of Gacaca it is going to be even more difficult. The implicated 
ones are going to be judged.  That might cause problems between the Inyangamugayo and those accused. The majority of the people in the cell are implicated, 
so they do not want the truth to be clarified.
The important social relations date from before the war.  The persons, the families that have hidden me during the war have a special meaning to me.  We still 
have a climate of love between us.  (…) is someone that has helped us.  He has given money to the groups that came to attack us.  The government is currently 
doing nothing special for those people, except drawing up their list at the Gacaca sessions. The conseiller [local authority – in 1994] also. He tried to say that 
there were no hidden families there; he organized meetings to calm the people down.  He has also organized the resistance.
Here I am ok.  The situation is good, except for the security that is not good because of Gacaca.  It is better that Gacaca takes place, because the crimes 
must be punished but the hearts become more fierce rather than relieved. There are those who refuse to admit their crimes, the ideology of  the genocide is 
still there.  When people realize that they will be unmasked, they are getting angry at those who are about to testify. There are people having the ideology 
of the genocide, even if it is difficult to observe.  But “ you can not deny the eye that looks at you in an evil way”. If the Gacaca process is over, we can see 
afterwards.
Despite the limited security, the situation is improving.  We currently have strong leaders, which was not the case before. From Nyumbakumi up to the level 
of the president of the Republic everything is fine.
We are currently secure; we have good leaders.  During the presidential elections we were afraid that another person might be elected. If it had been anybody 
else, that would have been terrible for us.  In 1994 I absolutely did not have any confidence in myself, we stayed concealed.  Even when there were people 
bringing us food, we could not eat it because of the despair. Before the war I had a lot of confidence in myself.  Now there are the incertainties, the anxiety.
The reasons of the political changes since 1994 are the lack of truthfulness and stability.  I find that it works now.  After the victory of the FPR lots of things 
have changed.  The people who did not do their job well were removed from their posts.
I wish for security and I wish it also for the whole of Rwanda.  Everybody should accept what the government expects us to.  The problem is that we are asked 
to live in peace, but some said that they did not want to.  I can’t say anything about the future, but it is possible that the best times belong to the past, looking 
at the people.  Only God can arrange things.
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Central Central South-East South North-West North
POPULATION
Total Population 2006 3695 7950 10012 2373 9385 5114
Total Population 1994 3130 5940 8286 14984 7824 1370
Total Population 1990 2930 5391 9308 13608 6706 1571
Hutu Population 1994 2885	(92.2%) 4303 (81,7%) 6190 (74,7%) 1618	(10,8%) 7325 (93,7%) 1368 (99,9%)
Tutsi Population 1994 245	(7.8%) 1088 (18,3%) 2096 (25,3%) 13366	(89,2%) 499 (6,3%) 2 (0.0%)
GENOCIDE
Starting Date 19th		April 8th April 14th April 10th	April 6th April No Violence
Highest Intensity 20-24th	April 14-25th April 14-20 April 10-14th	April 6-7th April No Violence
End Date 11-12th	May 5th May 17th May 25th	April 7th April No Violence
RPF Arrival 4th	July 15th June 17th May 25th	April 10th July  No Violence

















Meetings No In 6 out of 10 
cellules
In 3 out of 12 cells In	3	out	of	5	
cellules
In 2 out of 6 
cellules
In 0 out of 5 cells
Arms Distribution No In 9 out of 10 
cellules
In 8 out of 12 cells In	3	out	of	5	
cellules
In 2 out of 6 
cellules
In 5 out of 5 cells
Barriers 14 29 19 6 3 3
Interahamwe Inside Sector In	2	out	of	5	cells In 6 out of 10 cells In 9 out of 12 cells In	4	out	of	5	cells In 5 out of 6 cells In 0 out of 5 cells
Interahamwe Coming from 
the Outside
No Yes Yes Yes No No
































Conseiller Contra	/	Passive Passive Unknown Killed	(Tutsi)	 Active /
Responsables Mix.	2	Active	/	3	
Passive
Mixed Unknown Mixed Active /
N° Local Authorities 
Implicated
2 34 70 7 11 /
Local Elite Contra	/	Passive Active Active Active Active /
N° Houses Destroyed 58 52 289 2210 N/A 0
N° People That Saved 
During the Genocide
32 71 54 2 9 3
Tutsi Inhabitants Killed 128 262 491 12758 346 0IOB Discussion Paper 2007-06 •  Living the Transition
Tutsi Inhabitants Killed 
Elsewhere
30 291 1284 70 70 0
Tutsi Passers-By Killed 55 155 472 108 12 0
Former Tutsi Inhabitants 
Survivor
87 535 321 538 83 2
Tutsi Inhabitants Currently 
Survivor
31 229 215 292 83 2
WAR	-	AFTERMATH	
War (1990-1994) Low Low No No Medium High
Insurgency War (1996-
1999)
Low Low No No High High
Military Attack No Yes No No No Yes
 Massacres (RPF) No No No Yes Yes Yes
Revenge Killings No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Terror  Low Medium Medium High Very High Very High
PRISONERS	(genocide	crimes)
Released  9 149 374 41 0 1
Incarcerated (until 2006) 55 70 202 200 N/A 0
% Hutu Population (‘94) in 
prison
2% 5% 9% 14,8% N/A 0,0%
GACACA	ACCUSATIONS
Total Accused 833 1950 1526 1037 693 35
Category 1 79 115 77 N/A 76 1
Category 2 419 863 894 N/A 281 34
Category 3 337 581 558 N/A 381 0
Confessions (%) (2006) 42	/	5%	of	
accused
123 / 6% of 
accused




43 /6.2% of 
accused
0 / 0% of accused
% Hutu Population (‘94) 
Accused 
28,8% 45,3% 24,6% 64% 9% 2,5%
GOVERNANCE	1980s
Bourgmestre Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu
Conseiller Hutu Hutu Hutu Tutsi Hutu Hutu
Responsables Hutu Mixed Hutu Mixed Hutu Hutu
Dominant Party MRND MRND MRND MRND MRND  MRND
GOVERNANCE	1990-1994
Bourgmestre Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu
Conseiller Hutu Hutu Hutu Tutsi Hutu Hutu
Responsables Hutu Mixed Hutu Mixed Hutu Hutu
Multipartyism / Dominant 
Party




Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi N/A
Coordinator (conseiller) Hutu Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Hutu
Responsables Hutu Mixed Mixed Tutsi Hutu Hutu
Dominant Party RPF RPF RPF RPF RPF RPF
 